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Bridging the Cultural Divide: NGO-Military Relations in Complex Environments¹

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“In recent years the lines separating war, peace, diplomacy, and development have become more blurred, and no longer fit the neat organizational charts of the 20th century. All the various elements and stakeholders working in the international arena – military and civilian, government and private – have learned to stretch outside their comfort zone to work together and achieve results.”

-U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Washington, D.C., 15 July 2008

Introduction

Since the late 17th century, the Peace of Westphalia and its subsequent norms privileged the sovereignty of states in the international system. The strength of this tradition grew over time and reached a zenith during the 20th century as the United States and the Soviet Union “waged” a Cold War. Both superpowers were generally unwilling to overtly challenge these rules of international sovereignty because of the polarized nature of the international system, the zero-sum arithmetic that applied to allies and enemies, and the overwhelming threat nuclear weapons posed to the system’s survival. However, the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the rise of globalization led to the ascendancy of transnational issues such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, poverty, and migration. As a result, international norms of state, territorial-based sovereignty were weakened, particularly in fragile and failing countries, where negative externalities associated with state failure threatened regional and global stability. This trend in international norms is also reflected in the United Nation’s Responsibility to Protect doctrine and a rebalancing in focus away from the security of the state toward the security of individuals (i.e., human security).² This shift in emphasis is also present in U.S. strategic thought, as evidenced by passages of the National Security Strategy of 2002 which state, “America is now threatened less by conquering states than by failing ones”.³ In fact, containing transnational security issues and recognizing the human security imperative is becoming a *casus belli* itself – a reason for intervening through military and humanitarian operations.

Accompanying these trends was an increase in the number and scale of operations by the US military; many of these were operations for which the U.S. military is not traditionally prepared for or necessarily comfortable with (i.e., peacekeeping and peace-enforcement duties).⁴ At the same time, the United States’ foreign aid and development agency staffs and budgets were

¹ Author note: **This article is a draft for discussion. Please do not cite or distribute without permission of the author.**

² International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, "Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty" (Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Canada, 2001), United Nations General Assembly, "2005 World Summit Outcome" (paper presented at the World Summit, New York, NY, 15 September 2005), United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1674" (paper presented at the Security Council Meeting, New York, NY, 28 April 2006).

³ White House, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," ed. Office of the President of the United States (Washington, DC: 2002), 1.

⁴ Panama, Persian Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo, etc.

reduced (in real terms and as % of GDP) as the ideological battle for “political hearts and minds” in the Cold War ended.⁵ This decrease in official development assistance budgets resulted in a “vacuum left by civilian agencies, which struggled to deploy adequate numbers of personnel and to deliver assistance in insecure environments, in addition to chronic under-investment by the United States in non-military instruments.”⁶ The balance between the three primary U.S. actors in the international arena (U.S. military, U.S. civilian government agencies and non-governmental organizations) changed, and the result was a shift in U.S. foreign policy. The responsibility for humanitarian and development assistance partially shifted in two directions; on one hand, the U.S. military filled some of this gap, particularly in hostile or non-permissive environments where the military and NGOs are most likely to encounter each other. On the other hand, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) and International Organizations (IO) also stepped in as staff cuts at development agencies led to a greater reliance on NGOs and aid contractors to implement assistance programs on the ground.

An unintended consequence of this adjustment was increasing interaction of two unlikely partners: NGOs and the U.S. military as actors in fragile and failing states. The U.S. military rediscovered its role in relief and reconstruction due to the U.S. governments renewed focus on conflict prevention and human security. Thus, the U.S. military found itself conducting low-intensity stability and support operations in a number of countries in the 1990s quickly followed by combat, counterinsurgency, and stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001. In many of these places, the military encountered NGOs that were already established actors and, in some cases, had been working on humanitarian issues in the region for two generations or more. The nature of the interaction between NGOs and the military changed, in hindsight, from one of *relatively* straightforward co-existence in the 1990s to a relationship complicated by overlapping mandates, a volatile security environment, competition, and in some cases, antagonism.

Yet, because these two entities are extremely important external actors in fragile or failing states, they have much to gain from a *sustained, methodical, and purposeful* discourse. If the military and NGOs can develop new modes of interaction however much their respective goals and motives may differ—a great potential exists for improved cooperation in the realms of conflict prevention and human security, to say nothing of furthering NGOs’ development goals and American foreign policy and security objectives.

It is important to acknowledge up front that the goal of this paper is not to bring the two communities closer together, establish formal modes of cooperation or develop a deeper friendship. Rather, the goal of this paper is to candidly examine the NGO-U.S. military relationship and challenge its underlying assumptions in an effort to contribute to a sustained and purposeful dialogue between the two communities. To do this, the paper first defines the concept of a Non-Governmental Organization and its many variants. This is important because it is very difficult (and sometimes counterproductive) to generalize about the overall community due to the diversity in NGO mission, size, funding, scope and organization. Because ‘words’ do matter, the second section of the paper briefly clarifies terminology and concepts to clearly

⁵Curt Tarnoff and Larry Nowels, "Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy," ed. Congressional Research Service (Washington, DC: 2004).

⁶ Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, "The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DoD's Expanding Role," (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2007), 1.

establish a common ground for discussion and analysis. The third section examines the characteristics of each community by highlighting the key similarities and differences between NGOs and the military. While there are certainly organizational and cultural differences that burden this relationship, many important similarities exist that can increase mutual understanding. The paper then looks at the effects of the current strategic and operating environment on NGOs in an effort to identify potential challenges in the NGO-Military relationship. In particular, it looks at the principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality in the current environment in an effort to determine the universal applicability of these imperatives as reason for distance from the military. In the fifth section, the paper considers the same effects of the strategic and operational environment, but analyzes their impact on the military by primarily focusing on the military's evolving role in relief and reconstruction as the primary focal point for NGO-military friction and discord. Finally, the paper reviews the current status of the relationship and identifies areas for future discussion and research.

What is an NGO?

Although NGOs have existed for over 150 years and have become a permanent fixture in the international community in the last two decades, there is still significant confusion in security and foreign policy (and even humanitarian!) circles as to what a NGO is, what a NGO does and why they do what they do. NGOs have their roots in organizations developed in association with the creation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in the nineteenth century⁷. Precursors to today's NGOs also played prominent roles in slavery abolition, women's suffrage, international labor conventions and other prominent policy and social issues of the past. The rise of many of today's prominent and large NGOs (CARE, Save the Children, International Rescue Committee) occurred as a response to the civilian human suffering during and following World War II. A second and much more intense period of NGO growth occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s as the Cold War ended and the prominence and frequency of international humanitarian crises and interventions increased; there were approximately 1000 NGOs in existence prior to the start of World War I and, as of 2005, that number has increased to over 45,000.⁸

Fundamentally, an NGO is a "self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering by promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, conflict resolution and encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society."⁹ In looking at the community as a whole, Katarina West best described it "like a pyramid that has a few big multinational NGOs at the top, thousands of small, local NGOs at the bottom and a number of medium-sized NGOs in the middle."¹⁰ Furthermore, many large NGOs are organizationally aligned with both an International headquarters and country-specific organizations - each with their own distinct policies and perspectives (Save the Children, MSF, Oxfam, etc).

⁷ O. P. Richmond and H. F. Carey, *Subcontracting Peace: The Challenges of NGO Peacebuilding* (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2005), 21.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ R. Perito, *Guide to Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations* (United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007).

¹⁰ West, K. *Agents of altruism*: Ashgate Aldershot, Hants, 2001., 217.

At the most general level, NGOs can be grouped into one of two categories, depending on their primary function: operational or advocacy.¹¹ In this construct, Operational NGOs focus on the delivery of goods and social services to local populations in need. In contrast, Advocacy NGOs focus on raising awareness regarding specific issues by lobbying governments and international organizations and through media exposure.¹² In reality, this distinction is often blurred as many NGOs, particularly large, international ones, conduct a broad spectrum of activities that can be construed as both operational and advocacy.¹³ A more specific and useful typology of NGOs is found in *USIP Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations* which groups NGOs into four major categories by organizational focus: humanitarian assistance, human rights, civil-society and democracy building and conflict resolution.¹⁴ Within these categories, NGOs can conduct both operational activities in the field while at the same time advocating for specific issues to home governments and foreign capitals.

While the NGO community is large and tremendously diverse, there are national and international umbrella organizations (or NGO coalitions) that endeavor to represent many of the common concerns and positions of the NGO community. In the United States, the largest of these national coalitions is the American Council for Voluntary International Action (InterAction), a coalition of over 170 NGOs focused primarily on poverty alleviation. In addition, the Alliance for Peacebuilding is a U.S. NGO coalition representing NGOs focused on conflict resolution and peace-building. The Canadian Council for International Co-operation plays a similar role in Canada and in Europe, the Voluntary Organisation for Cooperation in Emergencies (VOICE) and the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) exist to coordinate and represent European humanitarian NGOs. At the international level, a number of broad NGO coalitions exist, including the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR), the International Council for Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) and the United Nations Interagency Standing Committee (IASC). While none of these coalitions purport to speak exclusively for the NGO communities they represent, they are generally able to provide exposure and a focal point for important humanitarian issues.

Words matter: Definitions and concepts in the NGO-Military Relationship

The task of generating useful discourse about NGO-military interaction is made more difficult by a wide array of competing frames, terminologies, and concepts that apply to the entire spectrum of conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction, development assistance, and foreign aid. Because *words* do matter, it is useful to take a moment to clarify some of the more important terms and concepts.

At the most general level, there are different and parallel definitions regarding the provision of assistance to foreign populations. The military act of providing this support to foreign countries is referred to as “relief and reconstruction” activities while the actual assistance

¹¹ Doh, J. P., and H. Teegen. *Globalization and NGOs: Transforming business, government, and society*: Praeger Publishers, 2003. and The World Bank, "The World Bank and Civil Society."

¹² Peter Willetts, "What is a Non-Governmental Organization?," *UNESCO Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems* (2002), <http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/CS-NTWKS/NGO-ART.HTM#Part10>.

¹³ This is what Parker calls hybrid NGO)

¹⁴ Perito, *Guide to Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations*.

is defined as “humanitarian and civic assistance” (HCA).¹⁵ Specifically, HCA describes “assistance to the local populace [which] is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. This assistance is specifically authorized by Title 10, United States Code, section 401.”¹⁶ HCA, provided under the aegis of relief and reconstruction activities, is generally conducted as part of Stability and Support Operations (SASO).

On the other hand, USAID and most humanitarian organizations use “development assistance” and “humanitarian assistance” (collectively-“foreign aid”) as two separate and distinct concepts.¹⁷ Develop assistance is designed to foster long-term sustainable broad-based economic progress and social stability in developing countries whereas humanitarian assistance is provided for the immediate alleviation of humanitarian emergencies during and after natural or man-made disasters or conflict.¹⁸

In terms of conceptual frameworks, there are also competing paradigms across the communities. Fundamentally, one can think in temporal terms such as “pre-conflict” and “post-conflict” operations, such as the traditional military campaign planning sequence that currently proceeds through six sequential phases.¹⁹ Moreover, the U.S. Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) utilizes a Post Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks Matrix organized around six sectors: security, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, economic stabilization and infrastructure, and governance and participation.²⁰ Likewise, the State Department’s own USAID utilizes a slightly different and more general framework in their 2005 Fragile States Strategy; USAID focuses on security, social, economic and political.²¹ Finally, in a promising display of interagency synchronization, the U.S. Army’s recently updated Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations*, adopts the same theoretical construct for its Stability Sectors, as does the S/CRS Essential Task Matrix.²²

The frameworks discussed above are part of the beginning of an evolution in U.S. government security policy known as a “whole of government approach” (WGA) or the “3Ds” of Development, Diplomacy, and Defense.²³ This transformation is part of a larger effort to

¹⁵ Admiral Mike Mullen, “Capstone Concept for Joint Operations,” ed. Department of Defense (Washington, DC: United States Joint Forces Command, 2009), Department of the Army, “Field Manual 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics,” ed. Department of the Army Headquarters (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004).

¹⁶ Department of the Army, “Field Manual 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics,” 1-95.

¹⁷ Foreign Assistance Act (Pub.L. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424, enacted September 4, 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2151

¹⁸ Tarnoff and Nowels, “Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy.”

¹⁹ Department of Defense, “Joint Publication 3-0 Operations,” ed. OSD (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008), IV-26.

²⁰ Department of State, “Reconstruction and Stabilization Essential Tasks,” ed. Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (Washington, DC: 2005).

²¹ United States Agency for International Development, “Fragile States Strategy,” ed. Department of State (Washington, DC: 2005), 4.

²² Department of the Army, “Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations,” ed. Department of the Army Headquarters (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008), 4-10.

²³ Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, *Greater than the Sum of Its Parts: Assessing “Whole of Government” Approaches to Fragile States* (Washington, DC: International Peace Academy, 2007).

rebalance the U.S. government approach to national security by emphasizing the non-military components (Diplomacy and Development) of U.S. government capabilities. While viewed by many in the USG as an important and overdue first step, many in the NGO community are wary of just such a change. Some see the whole of government approach as an example of the cure being worse than the disease. Currently, NGOs recognize the lack of adequate U.S. government civilian capacity for operations in fragile states does potentially hamper progress. However, the NGO community is equally concerned that moving to a whole of government approach could subsume the United States Agency for International Development and Department of State into the objectives of the Department of Defense due to its disproportionate size, resources, and traditional influence with Congress. Furthermore, because the whole of government approach is generally accepted as a framework for strengthening national security, NGOs are extremely reluctant to utilize it or, more importantly, view themselves as a component within it. Additionally, NGOs even remain reluctant to embrace concepts as broad-based as “whole of society” or “whole of community” approaches. Why is this? Any acceptance of a partnership, relationship or cooperation between the USG and NGOs in pursuit of ends other than humanitarian assistance is viewed by NGOs as compromising their impartiality and neutrality. This challenges not only their fundamental operating principles in the abstract, but also potentially their physical security in the field.

For their part, NGOs do not have a generally accepted overarching framework within which they operate. The various national and international NGO coalitions such as Interaction or VOICE provide some level of leadership and coordination; however, there are very few efforts at common policy-making.²⁴ This can be attributed to the diverse nature of the NGO community that tends not to primarily view their humanitarian and development work as a means to a security or stability end. More simply, the general lack of doctrine or coherent policy-making within the community also tends to inhibit the development of such a construct. The closest the NGO community comes to adopting an overarching framework is an informal reliance on an “event-centric” perspective organized along a spectrum of hostility/permisiveness that begins with peacetime and moves toward combat.²⁵ In addition, NGOs specifically reference disaster-response and relief as one area (presumably within the peacetime portion of the spectrum) where military involvement in humanitarian assistance is generally more acceptable, particularly if specific military resources are considered a necessary part of the response; i.e., the Navy’s hospital ship *Comfort* or general sea-lift and air-lift capacities. This is because in disaster relief, the military and NGOs share a common means and end: to alleviate human suffering for humanitarian sake. Again, this contrasts with much of the military’s HCA work in conflict or non-permissive areas, where the NGO and military means are the same (development assistance), but the ends diverge significantly (humanitarian objectives vs. political/security objectives).

The Actors: Non-Governmental Organizations and the U.S. Military

²⁴ Some recent progress in this area includes the Sphere Project Minimum Standards, the UN’s IASC Guidelines and Rules, Steering Committee on Humanitarian Response Position Paper, and Interaction’s NGO/Military Guidelines.

²⁵ Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex Emergencies,” ed. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York: United Nations, 2008), 9.

While the focus of this paper is the relationship between the U.S. military and U.S. based NGOs, it is important to acknowledge up front the much larger universe in which humanitarian assistance, development and state-building takes place. Larry Minnear and Tom Weiss, in *Mercy Under Fire: War and Global Humanitarian Community*, provide a useful construct for framing the myriad actors involved in complex environments. They divide the actors according to their origin as either outside or inside the state in which they are operating.²⁶ Outside actors include: 1. The UN system (UNDP, World Food Program, World Bank, World Food Program, UNICEF, UNHCR, etc), and regional interstate organizations, 2. Bilateral state agencies, 3. ICRC & IFRC, 4. Foreign Military Forces and 5. International NGOs. Inside actors include 1. Host government agencies and personnel, 2. Armed opposition forces, and 3. Local NGOs. Each of these actors play a different, but still significant role in the current set of international interventions and conflicts, and the relationships between and among each of them are important to the success of any humanitarian or state-based intervention.

The focus of this paper, however, is primarily on the *outside* actors, specifically, U.S. based International NGOs and U.S. military land forces operating abroad. This narrows the analysis to a manageable level but in no way diminishes the importance (or challenges) of the complex relationships between foreign military forces, domestic military forces, United Nations organizations and international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Any analysis of the relationship between NGOs and the U.S. military would be incomplete without an examination of the fundamental characteristics of each entity. While the focus of this comparison is *between* NGOs and the military, it is equally important to note there are differences *within* both the NGO community and the U.S. military.²⁷ Neither community is monolithic. At a base level, both communities tend to vary primarily by purpose and goal; as mentioned before, NGOs tend to be classified according to their focus on humanitarian assistance, advocacy, societal development, or conflict resolution whereas military forces are more easily classified by the medium within which they are trained to operate (land, sea and air). There are also significant differences between the organizations such as culture, values, and available resources, to name a few.²⁸ The focus of this section is to identify the similarities and differences between communities to provide a more comprehensive understanding of each actor in the relationship.

Differences

There are six fundamental differences between NGOs and the military:

- *Government relationships & organizational purpose*
- *Organizational cultures & hierarchy*
- *Training and doctrine*
- *Financial resources*
- *Indigenous resources*

²⁶ L. Minnear and T. G. Weiss, *Mercy under fire: war and the global humanitarian community* (Westview Press, 1995), 157.

²⁷ Francis Kofi Abiew, "NGO-Military Relations in Peace Operations," *International Peacekeeping* 10, no. 1 (2003): 25.

²⁸ Roy L. Allgauer, "The US Military and NGO Relationship during Post-Conflict Humanitarian Emergency Operations: How Can the US Military Improve It?," (Storming Media, 2006), 2-7.

- *Planning and operations horizon*

The U.S. military works directly for the U.S. government and operates in pursuit of political objectives determined by the civilian leadership in the Executive and Legislative branches. In the broadest sense, “the U.S. military is one of several instruments of national policy maintained to help shape the international political environment in support of U.S. interest.”²⁹ More narrowly, “the fundamental purpose of the military is to deter or wage war in support of national policy,” but it “may be employed in more benign ways for a variety of important purposes across a wide range of situations.”³⁰ In regards to conducting HCA, humanitarian objectives serve as intermediate means to U.S. political and strategic ends.³¹ This is perhaps the most important point to understand in the NGO-Military relationship. The military has political motives for conducting HCA while NGOs assert only a humanitarian motive.

Organizationally, the military culture is based on formal planning and decision-making paradigms, comfort with the use of force, and compartmentalization of information based on need-to-know and security concerns. The military’s hierarchy is extremely vertical and power flows from centralized decision-making centers (commanders). The military conducts vast amounts of pre-, during, and post-deployment training and evaluation that is based on volumes of formally developed and vetted policy and doctrine. The military’s financial resources are significant and are well documented. The U.S. military currently accounts for nearly half of *global* defense spending and ranks 4th in spending as a % of GDP compared with other G20 nations. More importantly, its share of U.S. Government (USG) development assistance rose to over 20 percent from 3 percent in the early part of this decade.³² The military often contracts for indigenous firms, personnel, and resources to implement its assistance activities and for administrative support, but, as opposed to NGOs, the military rarely, if ever, utilizes private citizens from the local community to manage its local operations.³³ Finally, the military’s planning and operational time horizon is directly impacted by the length of its operational deployments and is characteristically short-term in nature.

On the other hand, NGOs are formed from civil society and are separate from the USG. To reiterate the point from above, NGOs believe their organizational missions are not guided by political objectives, but rather, the humanitarian imperative to relieve suffering wherever it is found. In regards to organizational culture, NGOs conduct less formal planning, operate based on consensus rather than direction and, in general, the type of person drawn to work for an NGO will be much less comfortable with the use of force. NGOs generally tend to conduct much of

²⁹ Mullen, "Capstone Concept for Joint Operations."

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Reuben Brigety refers to this as the difference between instrumental and fundamental assistance. See Reuben E. Brigety, II., "Humanity as a Weapon of War: Sustainable Security and the Role of the U.S. Military," in *Sustainable Security Series*, ed. Center (Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, 2008), 4, 19-21.

³² Patrick and Brown, "The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DoD's Expanding Role," 1. And United States Central Intelligence Agency, "Military Expenditures," in *World Factbook* (2005).

³³ Allgauer, "The US Military and NGO Relationship during Post-Conflict Humanitarian Emergency Operations: How Can the US Military Improve It?," 5.

their training “on-the-job” and have very little formal doctrine to guide their actions.³⁴ NGO financial resources are constrained by their ability to raise funds from private donors and their ability and willingness to accept funds from government agencies such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Department of State (DoS). However, NGOs are extremely adept at using indigenous resources not only for administrative staff, but also as their principal operations personnel in many foreign countries. Moreover, NGOs have a propensity to operate with a longer time horizon than does the military because of their indigenous staff, tendency to rely on personal relationships, and focus on providing for long-term development needs.

Commonalities

While the differences between NGOs and the military tend to generate the most heat and light, there are some fundamental commonalities between NGOs and the military that, once acknowledged, might serve to increase mutual levels of understanding and help mitigate personal apprehension:

- *Culture of Service*
- *Physical courage*
- *Mission focus*
- *International perspective*

The above commonalities all fundamentally relate to the type of individual drawn to serve in the U.S. military and a NGO. Individuals in both communities have dedicated their lives to some form of service. Moreover, by necessity of their respective operational environments and organizational mandates, these same individuals tend to be physically courageous, mission-focused and comfortable living in austere conditions. As part of this, they both generally endure long separations from loved ones during the course of their careers and have the benefit of exposure to foreign cultures which helps to engender an international perspective.

These commonalities and differences are important to acknowledge and accept as part of any dialogue between NGOs and the military. In the broadest sense, the differences between the two groups reside primarily at the organizational level, while the similarities tend to be at the individual level. This is promising because it suggests that differences arise from social and structural constructions and not necessarily the natural conditions of the security environment. Thus, while these tensions may exist, the need for cooperation remains in fragile and failing states and it is possible the effect of the current operating environment is rendering the two communities differences less problematic than traditionally thought.

³⁴ A possible exception to this is the increasing amount of “inter-NGO” doctrine and policy being created by organizations such as the United Nation’s Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), the US umbrella group Interaction and Sphere. See Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex Emergencies.”, Interaction, “Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations,” ed. Interaction, United States Institute for Peace, and U.S. Department of Defense (Washington, DC: 2007). and Steering Committee on Humanitarian Response (SCHR), “Position Paper on the role of international peacekeeping forces in the provision of humanitarian assistance.”, ed. Inter-Agency Standing Committee (Geneva: 2003).

Non-Governmental Organizations and Contemporary Challenges in Complex Environments

NGO Principles

Non-Governmental Organizations generally adhere to the principles laid out in the “Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief.”³⁵ Notwithstanding the title of this code, NGOs tend to bind themselves to this document in all environments, to include not only disaster relief, but more generally permissive and non-permissive development situations. The overarching premise of this document provides for three primary principles that guide NGOs in their work; they are the humanitarian imperative, independence, and impartiality. The *Humanitarian Imperative* ensures that NGOs are motivated solely by a desire to alleviate human suffering wherever it is found. *Independence* ensures that NGOs do not act as instruments of government foreign policy for non-humanitarian purposes. Finally, the principle of *Impartiality* ensures NGOs provide assistance according to need without regard to race, religion, nationality or political affiliation.³⁶ For their security in semi- or non-hostile environments, NGOs rely primarily on their perceived impartiality in the conflict around them to ensure their own safety. This imperative is primarily responsible for the distance NGOs maintain from the U.S. military in such environments, although, the “need for a clear separation between the military and the aid establishments are by no means as clear-cut on the ground as they are in ‘meeting-room discussions’.”³⁷ It is also important to bear in mind the perception of impartiality and neutrality as perceived through the eyes of local actors on the ground. Although in some “settings local people differentiate among international actors, they are generally more concerned with what is being provided than with who are the chosen agents of assistance and protection.”³⁸ As a consequence, it is necessary to acknowledge that the evolving character of non-state threats in non-permissive environments may be changing the nature of this imperative. NGO concerns about maintaining impartiality and neutrality while interacting with the military *may be* less significant in environments and amongst actors that view any western actor as partial and non-neutral due to social values, ethnic background, or religious affiliation. Thus, the delegitimization of the pillars of independence and impartiality may not be due to NGO interaction with the military but, rather, caused by changes in the threat environment of fragile and failing states.

The ICRC document specifically, and the NGO community more broadly, are generally silent regarding this possibility. In fact, the ICRC Code of Conduct, updated in 1996, is primarily focused on NGO operations as they relate to environments primarily dominated by state actors. For example, the document contains three annexes that describe the relationship between NGOs and host governments, donor governments, and intergovernmental organizations,

³⁵ International Committee of the Red Cross, “The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief,” in *Annex VI*, ed. International Committee of the Red Cross (1996).

³⁶ Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex Emergencies.”

³⁷ A. Donini et al., *Mapping the Security Environment: Understanding the Perceptions of Local Communities, Peace Support Operations, and Assistance Agencies* (Feinstein International Famine Center, Tufts University, 2005), 54.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 63.

but largely avoids the issue of transnational actors such as terrorists or religious extremists.³⁹ In this regard, perhaps the NGO community is mistakenly discounting the threats extant in the current international environment.

In addition to the effect the current operating environment is having on NGO principles of impartiality and independence, there are additional strategic and operational challenges facing NGOs. The existing literature regarding humanitarian aid and non-governmental organizations identifies five related challenges NGOs face with regards to their operations and presence in complex security environments.

Performance and Accountability

The first challenge is closely related to a charge often leveled against the military; compared to their own stated goals, NGO performance and effectiveness is generally substandard, specifically as it relates to cost-effectiveness, sustainability, and popular participation in their humanitarian and assistance work.⁴⁰ Importantly, the level of their performance and effectiveness can potentially create security challenges for the US military operating in the same area. Specifically, studies indicate the principle of impartiality can lead to the provision of resources to warring sides and relatedly, external aid provision can free-up internal resources for use in prolonging internal conflicts and legitimizing warring sides. Moreover, NGO hiring of local personnel can contribute to economic market distortions (for both labor and goods) and reinforces existing societal divisions which may further exacerbate, if not sustain, existing security challenges.⁴¹

In addition to this uncertain performance in the field which can serve to distort local populace incentives, there is also a concern regarding NGO accountability. While NGO initiatives like the Sphere Project have attempted to address this issue in regards to development projects and standards, there are still concerns about what is known as “the democracy deficit”; potential problems may arise from a situation where operational NGOs are not accountable to the local populace or government, but rather, primarily to donors and funding sources. This is problematic in that it can significantly impact NGO responsiveness to the needs of their beneficiaries in local populations and potentially complicates U.S. military and civilian agency’s attempts to coordinate and synchronize efforts in a given region.

Funding

The “democracy deficit” is related to and leads toward a third critique of NGOs regarding donor funding and its impact on an NGO’s perceived independence and neutrality. While estimates vary, there are large numbers of NGOs that receive over 25% of their funding from official government sources.⁴² This relationship between NGOs and the U.S. Government complicates the NGO “non-governmental” distinction and can serve to reduce their independence.⁴³ For example, if an advocacy NGO relies on official government funds, their

³⁹ See Annexes I, II and III of Cross, "The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief."

⁴⁰ Richmond and Carey, *Subcontracting Peace: The Challenges of NGO Peacebuilding*, 39.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, 40

⁴² Need citation

⁴³ This point is also true with respect to the influence of private donors on NGOs goals and objectives. See Djenna Jalovic, "Who Leads, Who Follows and Who is Able? The Operational and Strategic Relations between

ability to question and criticize that same government's policies is potentially compromised by a natural unwillingness to "bite the hand that feeds." Relatedly, both operational and advocacy NGOs, regardless of the status of their respective funding, may find themselves becoming "donor-driven". That is, their projects may be supply driven based on donor demands rather than demand driven based on recipient need. It is also reasonable to question the effect that donor (government or otherwise) monitoring and evaluation requirements have on NGOs' ability and freedom to design and implement projects of their own. NGO work in these environments may become increasingly defined by U.S. government goals and objectives if they use a USAID framework (due to contractual requirements in funding agreements) for monitoring and evaluation of their own programs.⁴⁴

Another area of concern is the effect of competition among and between NGOs for donor funds found in an increasingly important private "charity market". Observers of humanitarian and development aid identify this competition as being responsible for not only adversely affecting NGO programs and focus, but also for "professionalizing" many NGOs, resulting in organizations that are as bureaucratic, hierarchical and professional as the governments they purportedly replace in the development and aid realm. In fact, there is growing evidence that working in an NGO is now simply another part of a young, educated policy professional's career, similar to and part of the same career progression that includes working in government or working for a for-profit consulting firm in the private sector. The above funding concerns serve to reinforce the U.S. military concern that the evolving character of the strategic and operational environment may be changing the importance of NGOs maintaining impartiality and neutrality while interacting with the military.

Politics and Humanitarian Assistance

Finally, there are nuanced complexities in the NGO claim to be motivated solely by the humanitarian imperative. While many NGOs claim this humanitarian imperative and eschew political motivations for their work in principle, the nature of the contemporary environment, defined in part by mass media, increased competition for funding, and intolerant extremist groups makes the practice of such goals more difficult. This can be attributed to two casual factors. First, an inherent tension exists between securing funding and politics. In many cases, "geopolitical hotspots", which are likely to have the least amount of humanitarian space (defined in part by an absence of foreign military forces), are also likely to be the object of significant amounts of private and official donor funding (and may account for some of the increased interaction between the military and NGOs). This dependence on private, unprogrammed funding can also impact NGOs claims to have a long-term horizon regarding their operations. It is important here to make the distinction between the duration of a physical presence in a country and the amount of resources devoted to that same location. It does not necessarily follow that a long-term presence in a specific location equates to a long-term development horizon. If NGO donor sources are partially motivated by "ephemeral" political considerations (either in regards to location, or specific issue, etc), then NGOs may unintentionally be forced to leave (or

International Organizations, the Military and NGOs," in *Weak States and Sudden Disasters and Conflicts: The Challenge for Military-NGO Relations* (Ottawa, Canada: 2005), 3.

⁴⁴ Doh, J. P., and H. Teegen. *Globalization and NGOs: Transforming business, government, and society*: Praeger Publishers, 2003, 97.

significantly scale-back operations) in a certain area when the respective “political issue du jour” is replaced by a different issue in another part of the world. This movement out of or scaling back in a certain area can “contribute to a general decline in local self-sufficiency and self-help that makes the transition back to a peacetime economy more difficult.”⁴⁵ Second, and more simply, apolitical intervention and assistance in complex security environments is increasingly difficult given that an outsider’s presence in an area is political by its very nature as their efforts always involve decision-making regarding the allocation of scarce and valued resources. This is true, even if an NGO is doing nothing more than attempting to maintain an *a priori* status quo. Moreover, inherently political issues such as women’s education and rights, civil-society development and economic development are largely western, liberal notions that have political ramifications above and beyond the humanitarian benefits they may bring to an area or people.

In sum, NGOs are confronted with (and in some cases create) many challenges to their operations in contemporary environments that complicate their normative claims to operate solely according to the principles of humanitarianism, independence and neutrality. There are also important NGO funding and political considerations which impact these principles and impact NGO effectiveness in servicing local populations. These issues are important to acknowledge in a relationship defined primarily by difference in motivation...

The U.S. Military and Contemporary Challenges in Complex Environments

While NGOs do face operational and strategic challenges to their humanitarian efforts, it is the military’s role (and performance) in humanitarian and civic assistance that lies at the center of the discussion (and discord) regarding the interaction of the military and NGOs in developing and post-conflict countries around the world. As recently recognized by Reuben Brigety of the Center for American Progress, the “increasing involvement of the U.S. armed forces in addressing the basic human needs of civilians abroad represents one of the most profound changes in U.S. strategic thought and practice in at least a generation”.⁴⁶ This section will briefly review the military’s adaptation to this new role before it analyzes challenges to the military’s effectiveness.

Policy and Doctrine Changes

A review of recent Presidential, Department of Defense, and Department of State policy initiatives illustrates this change in strategic thought; they indicate an increase in the amount and scope of formal directives, guidelines and doctrine regarding the military’s role in humanitarian and civic assistance. The National Security Strategy of 2002, which emphasizes weak and failing states as threats, captures the strategic perspective most notably. Moreover, Department of Defense Directives and armed forces Joint Publications also contain similar strains of thought. For the military’s ground forces, this evolution in thought culminates in U.S. Army operational doctrine such as the recently revised Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations*.⁴⁷ This flurry of

⁴⁵ Richmond and Carey, *Subcontracting Peace: The Challenges of NGO Peacebuilding*, 41.

⁴⁶ Dr. Reuben E. Brigety, II, "Military's Role in Development Assistance-Testimony," in *Testimony to Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, ed. US Senate, U.S. Senate (Washington, DC: 2008), 1.

⁴⁷White House, "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization," in *National Security Presidential Directive 44*, ed. Office of the President of the United States (Washington, DC: 2005). Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations," ed. Office of the Secretary of Defense (Washington, DC: 2005).

policy and doctrinal activity is an implicit recognition by the U.S. government that the international security environment has changed and there is now a more urgent benefit in development work for preventing conflict and furthering U.S. foreign policy goals, given the potential consequences of inattention to specific countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, etc).

Organizational Changes

In addition to policy and doctrine, the U.S. Government has begun to operationally innovate in the way it responds to unstable and fragile states. It has begun to combine its civilian foreign assistance and military humanitarian and civic assistance capacities through its regional Combatant Commands (COCOM) at the operational level (AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM, specifically) and Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan at the tactical level.

In regards to combatant commands, AFRICOM has the Department of Defense's regional lead in promoting "a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy."⁴⁸ This approach to Africa's security and stability uniquely blends civilian and military personnel expertise in a unified military command. In an unprecedented organizational construct, Ambassador Mary Carlin Yates is the Deputy to the AFRICOM Commander for Civil-Military Activities and is responsible for directing the commander's civil-military planning and programs, with emphasis on aligning AFRICOM's activities with that of other USG departments and agencies.⁴⁹ From the perspective of the USG pursuing a unified foreign policy, this development is a promising one. The assignment of non-DoD civilians to positions in AFRICOM clearly indicates a desire on the part of DoD to synchronize its activities with other agencies, and an interest on the part of other agencies to help influence how DoD operates. However, all of these non-DoD civilians serve only as detailees or LNOs—they do not bring any of their home agency authority to decide or act in the non-military realm. Moreover, for NGOs, there is concern about "whether the Department of Defense is 'getting out of its lane by usurping the role of USAID and other non-military agencies and infringing on the humanitarian and development space' that various NGOs occupy in Africa".⁵⁰ Another prominent NGO states that "the main concern of NGOs... is the militarization of humanitarian action. [We] cannot be supportive of... AFRICOM as long as it portends to be a humanitarian actor and promises to subsume humanitarianism

Department of Defense, "Joint Publication 3-08. Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations (2 volumes) ", ed. OSD (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), ———, "Joint Publication 3-07.3 Peace Operations," ed. OSD (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007), ———, "Joint Publication 3-57, Civil-Military Operations," ed. OSD (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008), Department of the Army, "Field Manual 3-0, Operations," ed. Department of the Army Headquarters (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008), ———, "Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations.", ———, "Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency," ed. Department of the Army Headquarters (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006).

⁴⁸ United States Africa Command "About AFRICOM," Department of Defense, <http://www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp>.

⁴⁹ Claudia E. Anyaso, "Women in International Security (WIIS)" (paper presented at the U.S. Army War College Africa Command Conference Washington, DC, 2008).

⁵⁰ Philip Seib and Carola Weil, "AFRICOM, the American Military and Public Diplomacy in Africa ", ed. Annenberg School of Communication (University of Southern California, 2008), 4.

within the ambit of military strategy.”⁵¹ Yet, in defense of AFRICOM’s goals and mission, General Kip Ward recently clarified AFRICOM’s role on the continent, reassuring “a growing number of skeptics...that the U.S. military is not in charge of foreign policy or development in Africa.”⁵² Understandably, there is much consternation on the part of the NGO community with AFRICOM even though it is not yet fully operational and engaged on the continent.

While AFRICOM is less than a year old, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) have been used at the tactical level for over 6 years, with the first PRTs being established in Afghanistan in 2002.⁵³ In early 2005, the PRT concept spread to Iraq and resulted in over 35 teams operating in the two theaters of operations. PRTs are small civil-military organizations focused on governance, security, and reconstruction issues. However, they face many of the same criticisms as the newly created AFRICOM does in respect to their development activities. Specifically, the use of Quick Impact Projects (see below) by PRTs to win the “hearts and minds” of the local populace is met with stiff resistance by the NGO community. NGOs feel that the military is “pushing beyond its traditional security mandate to provide humanitarian, development and reconstruction assistance.”⁵⁴ The interaction of PRTs and NGOs has also highlighted the military’s overestimation of the NGO community’s willingness to cooperate and participate with the military, specifically in regards to development work. Heretofore, the presence of civilians within the PRT and a focus on development has not provided sufficient reason for the NGO community to put aside their concern for impartiality and neutrality in order to work with the military (especially in hostile environments).

Military’s time horizon

Not surprisingly, the NGO community takes significant issue with this enlargement of the military’s purview and focus. From the NGO’s perspective, the military’s role in development is hampered by a number of issues. First, the military generally has a short-term development horizon, which can largely be attributed to three confounding factors: the expeditionary and rotational nature of military personnel/units, the fact that the time horizon is tied to the security situation (i.e., the sooner the context is benign, the sooner the military can strategically exit), and the military’s lack of core competencies in development assistance. With the exception of a small number of specialized personnel in the civil affairs career field, “maneuver” branches (infantry, armor, engineers) that lack genuine development training and competencies conduct much of the development work done by the military. From the military and often indigenous perspective, the NGO time horizon is too slow, as NGO workers in the field must seek funding and approvals for projects they identify as priorities.

Monitoring and Evaluation

⁵¹ Mark (Refugees International) Malan, "Exploring the US Africa Command and a New Strategic Relationship with Africa-Testimony " in *Testimony to Subcommittee on African Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations*, ed. US Senate, US Senate (Washington, DC: 2007), 2-4.

⁵² United States Africa Command, "General Ward on Voice of America - U.S. AFRICOM Not Taking Over Foreign Policy or Development in Africa," ed. US Africa Command (Washington, DC: 2009).

⁵³ Robert Perito, "The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified," ed. USIP (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2005), 2, United States Africa Command "About AFRICOM."

⁵⁴ Interaction, "Interaction on Civil-Military Relations," in *Policy Brief*, ed. Interaction (Washington, DC: Interaction, 2008), 1.

A second issue concerns the lack of sufficient and appropriate monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of humanitarian assistance and development projects.⁵⁵ Without empirical data from an effective M&E program, it is nearly impossible to assess and then justify the continued development work of any organization, be it military or otherwise. This is a crucial point for many in the NGO community, as they contend the cost-effectiveness of the military's development assistance is low and inefficient as compared to similarly provided NGO or IGO assistance. Unfortunately, there is little empirical data to point to one way or the other. For the military, this lack of sufficient M&E can be attributed to the aforementioned factors, in addition to being complicated by the often political and strategic ends for which the military is conducting such assistance. When the military is conducting development assistance activities primarily to win "hearts and minds" in pursuit of a greater security objective, the M&E of any particular project is less important than a decrease in violence or increase in stability in a given area or region.

Funding

The NGO community is also uneasy with the military's access to and use of funding for development and humanitarian assistance. The speed and relative bureaucratic ease with which the military can disburse the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) Funds is regarded by the military as a primary strength of the program. However, many in the NGO community view this speedy disbursement as exacerbating the haste with which the military plans and executes development assistance projects in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, NGOs are very concerned about the use of the relatively new "1207/1210 funds" by USAID and the Department of State.⁵⁶ They fear both the militarization of U.S. development aid and the potential instrumentalization of USAID for security purposes.⁵⁷

The above NGO concerns are exemplified in the military's propensity for conducting Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) in Iraq and Afghanistan. QIPs are small-scale short-term projects aimed at pacifying local populations and building trust.⁵⁸ They are generally undertaken by Provincial Reconstruction Teams and use quick-disbursing funds to complete the project. In addition to the above concerns regarding time horizon, funding, haste, development competency, and monitoring and evaluation, NGOs also criticize QIPs for a lack of project coordination that leads to constant overlap with other development actors in the area. Lastly, QIPs are commonly chided by development experts for "failing to take the longer-term development implications and sustainability questions into account."⁵⁹

Current Status of the Relationship and Ways Forward

⁵⁵ Eugene Bonventre, "Monitoring and Evaluation of Department of Defense: Humanitarian Assistance Programs," *Military Review* 88, no. 1 (2008).

⁵⁶ In Section 1207 of the FY 2006 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress authorized the DoD to transfer up to \$100 million per year to the Secretary of State for reconstruction, security or stabilization assistance to a foreign country. Congress reauthorized this authority in Section 1210 of the TY 2008 Defense Authorization Act. Office of Military Affairs, "DoD Section 1207/1210 Funds," ed. United States Agency for International Development (Washington, DC: 2008).

⁵⁷ For instrumentalization of USAID, see Interaction, "Interaction on Civil-Military Relations."

⁵⁸ Nima Abbaszadeh et al., "Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations," (Princeton, NJ: Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Affairs, 2008), 33.

⁵⁹ Patrick and Brown, "The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DoD's Expanding Role."

Over seven years have passed since the beginning of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan while operations in Iraq are in their sixth year. What is the current status of this relationship, and how has it evolved over time?

Early on, efforts have been focused on the creation and dissemination of the Interaction and Department of Defense (DoD) Guidelines at the policy/strategic level. A Civil-Military Working Group was established to create the guidelines and has continued to meet at the United States Institute of Peace's (USIP) headquarters on a bi-monthly basis to sustain the dialogue. More recently, Senior Development Advisors from USAID have been placed in each COCOM to act as interlocutors between NGOs and the military leadership. Additionally, NGO planning liaisons are being contemplated for use in the regional DoD Combatant Commands on an as necessary basis to provide input into contingency planning and operations. Finally, a NGO input and review process for Combatant Command Theater Campaign Plans (TCPs) is also a possibility.

At the operational and tactical level, there is an opportunity to begin training and education initiatives aimed at disseminating the Interaction/DoD Guidelines in military schools and at military training centers such as the National Training Center (NTC) in California and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) in Louisiana. In addition to the training centers, the guidelines should also be considered for inclusion into the Professional Military Education system and the formal doctrine centers at the Army's Training and Doctrine Command and Fort Leavenworth's U.S. Army Combined Arms Center.

Finally, there may be potential returns to further investment in the development of an analogous set of guidelines prescribing the behaviors and expectations of NGOs and the military in disaster response and/or non-hostile development environments. The latter would perhaps be most contentious given the NGO communities' stated preference for a military absence from development activities; however, there are likely benefits to be gleaned from just such a dialogue.

The above initiatives are signs of growth in the NGO-Military relationship. However, now is the time to fundamentally address the roles and responsibilities of NGOs and the military in complex environments. NGOs, like most civilian actors, simply do not see much of a role for the military in humanitarian space, even in the most dangerous of environments. The military, on the other hand, perceives a significant benefit to conducting humanitarian assistance and development work in all environments. For NGOs, the primary question is one of the proper divisions of labor. Thus, given current USG foreign policy and operational trends, can NGOs and the military reconcile their overlapping operational jurisdictions? Can the military be made appropriately aware of the long-term development consequences of its work? Can NGOs become sufficiently sensitive to the security dynamics of complex environments to recognize some problems are at least *temporarily* amenable to shorter-term humanitarian assistance solutions? While the operating environment may seem to dictate or suggest different models of cooperation (such as the UN-IASC model) based on security levels, the two communities should

more fundamentally define and determine clearer roles and responsibilities that might apply in all environments.⁶⁰

Conclusion

In this era of globalization, transnational challenges to the order and stability of the international system are as important as national sovereignty and security. Moreover, the struggle is multifaceted; it will require military, political, and civil efforts in concert. Thus, a complex array of stakeholders—government civilian agencies, international partners, non-government organizations, the military, the private sector, local workers, and many others—will be needed to face these evolving challenges. In particular, the relationship between NGOs and the military is likely to be an important one, even given a potential increase in the U.S. government's civilian capacities. Therefore, both communities must address the assumptions, preconceptions, and difficulties in their relationship in an open and honest manner. In the end, it is important to remember this relationship exists only because NGOs and the military share *some* common purposes such as preventing conflict and creating stability in fragile and failing states.

⁶⁰ Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex Emergencies."

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