



Welcome to Senior Conference XLVI

On behalf of Lieutenant General Franklin L. Hagenbeck, the Superintendent of the United States Military Academy, it is my honor and pleasure to welcome you to West Point.

This year's senior conference is entitled, "Bridging the Cultural Divide: NGO-Military Relations in Complex Environments." The United States Military Academy (USMA) Senior Conference provides a forum for distinguished representatives—from government, academia, business, the think-tank community, the joint military services, and, this year, non-governmental organizations—to discuss topics of national security importance. This year's conference, our forty-sixth gathering, continues that tradition of gathering the nation's brightest intellectual minds and focusing their efforts to examine this topic of critical importance to the Nation.

Senior Conference 2009 will address the challenges of bridging the cultural divide between civilian organizations and the military in the current era of international engagement. The United States is operating and will continue to function in challenging and fragile environments necessitating close coordination among civilian organizations and military personnel. The conference will examine this strategic environment, look at who we are and what we need from each other, study various lessons learned from past and present contingencies, and examine key challenges that result from expanded military role as well as key opportunities for education, development, and dialogue for both types of organizations.

Thank you again for joining us for Senior Conference. We are grateful to the United States Military Academy Association of Graduates and the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command for their support of this event.

MICHAEL J. MEESE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Professor and Head
Department of Social Sciences

SENIOR CONFERENCE XLVI STAFF

Colonel Mike Meese
Professor and Head
Department of Social Sciences

Colonel Cindy Jebb
Professor and Deputy Head

Lieutenant Colonel Isaiah Wilson III
Academy Professor for Conferences

Major Paul S. Oh
Executive Secretary

Major Matthew Lennox
Deputy Secretary

Major Mark Crow
Deputy Secretary

Captain Jason Galui
Transportation Officer

Major Jonathan Dunn
Billeting and Banquets Officer

Major Eric Jamison
Finance Officer

Mrs. Molly Wright
TRADOC Funding Manager

Major Nick Ayers
Rapporteur

Major Chris Danbeck
Rapporteur

Major Angelica Martinez
Rapporteur

Major Blaise Zandoli
Rapporteur

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IMPORTANT ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION

IMPORTANT NUMBERS

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Major Matthew Lennox	Deputy Secretary	938-3432
Major Eric Jamison	Finance Officer	938-3497
Ms. Molly Wright	TRADOC Fund Manager	839-0022
Captain Jason Galui	Transportation Officer	938-3345
Major Jonathan Dunn	Facilities Officer	938-2493
Social Sciences Admin Office		938-3554
Fax		938-5463
Hotel Thayer		446-4731

LODGING

Checking Out: We recommend checking out on Saturday prior to 8:00 a.m. (the start time for the fourth plenary session). Please allow some extra time for check out. The Thayer Hotel will hold your bags until you depart. You may drop them at the Crest Alcove (just behind where the fourth plenary session is held).

For questions or issues that the hotel staff cannot address, please see Major Jonathan Dunn, who is coordinating your lodging and will be present throughout Senior Conference.

TRANSPORTATION

Departure: Please review the sheet enclosed in your welcome packet which details your personal departure arrangements (time of ground transportation, airline, flight number), as we know them. If our information is not correct, or if you need to adjust your plans, please see Captain Jason Galui, the Conference Transportation Officer, as soon as possible.

In and Around: We will provide your ground transportation to and from all Conference events. If you have any special requirements please see Captain Jason Galui.

Reimbursement for Travel: If the Department of Social Sciences is funding your participation and you are a government employee, please fax or mail copies of all receipts to the attention of MAJ Eric Jamison at (845) 938-4563.

If you are getting recompensed for your participation in the conference using TRADOC funds, please contact Ms. Molly Wright with any questions and issues at (845) 839-0022.

Bridging the cultural divide between civilian organizations and the military is imperative in the current era of international engagement. The United States is operating and will continue to function in challenging and fragile environments necessitating close coordination among civilian organizations and military personnel. The fragmentation of states, ethnic conflict and failed governance across the globe has led to an increase in military, humanitarian, and NGO organizations' responses to these emergencies. The missions go far beyond traditional peacekeeping or enforcing ceasefires and stress comprehensive peace settlements. For a variety of reasons, including diverse organizational cultures and a perception of varied goals, cooperation among the players has been difficult both strategically and operationally. Given the importance of working together to promote development and achieve durable and sustainable peace, it is crucial to bridge the cultural divide that separates these organizations so that we may better capitalize on strengths while minimizing weaknesses.

The United States Military Academy (USMA) Senior Conference will examine the differing approaches of civilian organizations and the military operating in common space and explore the barriers to dialogue and potential cooperation. Perceptions on both sides have, in many cases, impeded cooperative action in international development and intervention in persistent conflict arenas. What lessons have been learned from previous interaction between NGOs, IGOs, host nations and the military in past operations? How should the military educate, train and prepare soldiers to operate with a variety of organizations in humanitarian and capacity-building operations? And likewise, how must NGO communities and other civilian organizations educate and train their personnel in preparation for employment in uncertain security environments? Panels will focus on key challenges facing the military and NGOs, and keynote speakers will suggest new directions for analysis and practice. Throughout these sessions, in which comments are “not for attribution,” there will be a free and candid exchange of ideas among all Conference participants.

Keynote speakers include Ambassador Ryan Crocker, who most recently served as ambassador to Iraq, Mr. Sam Worthington, President of InterAction, and Mr. Maxie McFarland, TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2. Invitees will include active duty and retired general officers, members of the NGO community, elected and other senior government officials, scholars, members of the business community, members of the press, and other senior members of the national security policy community.

Senior Conference provides a perfect forum—a sequestered and informal setting at West Point—for assembling a distinguished group of participants from government, non-governmental organizations, academia, business, the think-tank community, and the joint military services to discuss topics of national security importance. This year's conference, our forty-sixth gathering, continues that tradition of gathering the nation's brightest intellectual minds and focusing their efforts to examine this topic of critical importance to the Army. This year's conference is made possible through the generous support of the U.S Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and the West Point Association of Graduates.

Schedule for Thursday, 28 May 09

Civilian Business Attire

12 p.m.	Arrival	Thayer Hotel Lobby
6:00 – 7:00 p.m.	Reception	Garden Terrace, Thayer Hotel
7:00 p.m. – 10:00 p.m.	Dinner and Keynote Address	Lawn Terrace, Thayer Hotel
	Opening Address Ambassador Ryan Crocker <i>Former Ambassador to Iraq</i>	
10:00 p.m.	After Dinner Mixer	Hotel Lounge

Schedule for Friday, 29 May 09

Civilian Casual Attire for Plenary Sessions

7:00 – 7:40 a.m.	Breakfast	Dining Room, Thayer Hotel
7:40 – 7:45 a.m.	Meet at Thayer Lobby	Thayer Lobby
7:45 – 08:00 a.m.	Movement to Library	
8:00 – 9:30 a.m.	Plenary Session 1	Haig Room
9:30 – 9:45 a.m.	Break	Haig Room
9:45 – 11:15 a.m.	Plenary Session 2	Haig Room
11:15 – 11:30 a.m.	Movement to South Dock	
11:30 – 1:00 p.m.	Lunch and Boat Tour of Hudson	

Schedule for Friday afternoon, 29 May 09

Civilian Casual Attire for Plenary Sessions

Civilian Business Attire for Dinner

1:00 p.m. – 1:15 p.m.	Movement to Library	
1:15 – 2:00 p.m.	Practitioner’s Panel	Haig Room
2:00 – 2:15 p.m.	Break	
2:15 – 3:45 p.m.	Plenary Session 3	Haig Room
4:00 p.m.	Movement to Thayer Hotel <i>Or</i> Bus Tour of West Point	Bus
6:00 – 7:00 p.m.	Reception	Hudson Gallery, Thayer Hotel
7:00 – 10:00 p.m.	Dinner and Keynote Address Mr. Sam Worthington <i>President and CEO of InterAction</i>	Crest Terrace, Thayer Hotel

Schedule for Saturday, 30 May 09

Civilian Casual Attire

7:00 – 8:00 a.m.	Breakfast	Dining Room, Thayer Hotel
8:00 – 9:30 a.m.	Plenary Session 4	Crest Terrace, Thayer Hotel
9:30 – 9:45 a.m.	Break	
9:45 – 11:15 a.m.	Plenary Session 5	Crest Terrace, Thayer Hotel
11:15 – 11:30 a.m.	Break	
11:30 – 12:15 p.m.	Keynote Address Mr. Maxie McFarland <i>TRADOC Deputy Chief-of-Staff, G2</i>	Crest Terrace, Thayer Hotel
12:15 p.m.	Lunch Buffett	Thayer Hotel

PLENARY SESSION 1 (FRIDAY 0800-0930):

The Strategic Environment: Need for NGO-Military Dialogue

- What is the nature of the strategic environment and what kind of dialogue does it necessitate between NGOs and the military?
- What is the nature of the specific missions, and how does it affect the dialogue between the NGOs and the military?
- What is the state of the government, i.e. Congress, interagency cooperation, Department of State, USAID, etc, in facilitating this dialogue?
- What challenges (and opportunities?) does the new economic environment pose on the military and the NGOS, and their interaction with each other?

Moderator: Colonel Cindy Jebb, Deputy Department Head, Department of Social Sciences

Panelists: Ambassador Eugene Dewey, former Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
Ambassador John Herbst, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, State Department
Colonel Richard Lacquement, Army War College
Mr. Michael Khambatta, Deputy Head of Delegation, ICRC Wash D.C.

PLENARY SESSION 2 (FRIDAY 0930 - 1115):

Who We Are and What Do We Need From Each Other?

- What are the various types of NGOs and segments of the military that interact with each other? And how is this relationship evolving?
- What is the current status of the relationship? What has already been done to facilitate this relationship?
- In what contexts do NGOs and the military have objectives in common, and how can they help each other accomplish those objectives?
- What can't the NGOS provide the military and vice-versa, i.e. what are the limits to cooperation?

Moderator: Mr. Roland de Marcellus, Deputy Director, Office of Development Finance in the State Department's Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs

Panelists: Mr. Robert Perito, Senior Program Officer, United States Institute for Peace
Ms. Sarah Holewinski, Executive Director, The Campaign For Innocent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC)
Lieutenant Colonel (P) Kim Field, Military Advisor, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)
Mr. Michael Kleinman, Independent Humanitarian Emergency Assistance Consultant

PRACTITIONER'S PANEL (FRIDAY 1315 – 1400):

Lessons Gathered: The MacArthur Conflict and Human Security Studies (CHSS) Program

- What are the main challenges on the ground with regards to mutual understanding?
- What leadership skills were gathered from working with an NGO as a cadet and how has the experience helped you when you were deployed?
- What did the NGO gain from working with the cadets?
- How can the Army incorporate aspects of the CHSS program into their training program?

Moderator: Dr. Ruth Beitler, Professor of Comparative Politics, Program Director of the CHSS Program

Panelists: Ms. Donna McAleer, Advisor to CHSS program; Board member, Journey's Within Our Community
Major Angelica Martinez, Instructor, Department of Social Sciences, former Officer-in-Charge of CHSS trip to Ghana
2nd Lieutenant Robert Hammond, participant, MacArthur CHSS Program to Cambodia

PLENARY SESSION 3 (FRIDAY 1415 - 1545):

Lessons Learned from Various Contingencies

- What are some lessons learned from operating in the same space during disaster relief operations?
- What are some lessons learned from operating in the same space during peace-keeping operations?
- What are some lessons learned from operating in the same space during combat operations where U.S. is a participant?

Moderator: Colonel Jeffrey Peterson, Director of Economics Program, USMA

Panelists: Ms. Clare Lockhart, Director of the Institute for State Effectiveness
Ms. Sophie Delaunay, Executive Director, Doctors Without Borders/MSF-USA
Colonel Dominic Caraccilo, Executive Officer to Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I)
Commander, author of *Achieving Victory in Iraq*
Mr. Malcolm D. Johnson, Jr., Deputy Director, Directorate of Interagency Coordination, United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM)

PLENARY SESSION 4 (SATURDAY 0800 - 0930):

Key Challenges that Result from Expanded Military Role in Development and Preventing Conflicts

- How has the expanded military role helped/hurt NGO operations?
- How has the expanded military role helped/hurt the building of USG civilian government capacity?
- How has the NGOs operating in military's AO helped/hurt the execution of the military's expanded role?
- What are the challenges associated with information sharing between the military and the NGOs?

Moderator: Colonel Cindy Jebb, Deputy Department Head, Department of Social Sciences

Panelists: Mr. John Marks, President, Search for Common Ground
Colonel (ret) Peter Mansoor, Professor, History Department of Ohio State University, author of *Baghdad at Sunrise*
Mr. Mark Garlasco, Senior Military Analyst, Human Rights Watch

PLENARY SESSION 5 (SATURDAY 0945 – 1115)

Key Opportunities for Education, Development, and Dialogue

- What type of educational and training courses would be helpful at pre-commissioning sources to help prepare for civil-military operations?
- What types of education, training, or exercises would help “bridge the cultural divide” between these groups at the initial entry, midlevel, and senior levels?
- What studies can be conducted to facilitate NGO-military relationship?
- How can these organizations better prepare their members to work with/understand each other?
- How can other governmental actors help improve the relationship between the NGOs and military?

Moderator: Colonel Michael Meese, Department Head, Department of Social Sciences

Panelists: Major General Gregg Martin, Commanding General of Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN) and Fort Leonard Wood
Dr. Reuben Brigety, Director of Sustainable Security Program, Center for American Progress
Colonel (ret) Robert Gordon, Senior Vice President for Civic Leadership, City Year
Dr. Thoric Cederstrom, Senior Advisor, International Relief and Development

AMBASSADOR RYAN CROCKER

Ryan Crocker was confirmed as Ambassador to Iraq on March 7, 2007. He assumed Chief of Mission duties at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad on March 29, 2007 after serving as U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan from October 2004 to March, 2007. He served previously as the International Affairs Advisor at the National War College, where he joined the faculty in 2003. From May to August 2003, he was in Baghdad as the first Director of Governance for the Coalition Provisional Authority. He was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs from August 2001 to May 2003, and served previously as Ambassador to Syria (1998-2001), Ambassador to Kuwait (1994-1997) and Ambassador to Lebanon (1990-1993). Since joining the Foreign Service in 1971, he also has had assignments in Iran, Qatar, Iraq and Egypt, as well as Washington. He was assigned to the American Embassy in Beirut during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the bombings of the embassy and the Marine barracks in 1983.



He grew up in an Air Force family, attending schools in Morocco, Canada and Turkey, as well as the U.S. He received a B.A. in English in 1971 and an honorary Doctor of Laws degree in 2001 from Whitman College (Washington).

Ambassador Crocker received the Presidential Distinguished Service Award in 1994, the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Civilian Service in 1997 and the Presidential Meritorious Service Award in 1999 and 2003. He also holds the State Department Distinguished Honor Award, Award for Valor, three Superior Honor Awards and the American Foreign Service Association Rivkin Award. In January 2002, he was sent to Afghanistan to reopen the American Embassy in Kabul. He subsequently received the Robert C. Frasure Memorial Award for "exceptional courage and leadership" in Afghanistan. In September 2004, President Bush conferred on him the personal rank of Career Ambassador, the highest in the Foreign Service.

MR. SAM WORTHINGTON

Sam Worthington became the President and CEO of InterAction, the nation's largest alliance of relief and development nongovernmental organizations, in October 2006. Prior to joining InterAction, Mr. Worthington served as the Vice Chair of InterAction's Board of Directors, chaired its PVO Standards and Membership committee, and was co-chair of its Commission on the Advancement of Women. Previous to InterAction, he was the Chief Executive Officer of Plan USA (1994 to 2006), an InterAction member organization operating in 49 countries around the world. As CEO of Plan, he sat on Plan's global executive management team, and chaired Plan's national CEO team.



Mr. Worthington is a Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, serves on USAID's Advisory Committee for Voluntary Foreign Assistance (ACVFA) and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) at the United Nations, sits on the boards of the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign and the Alliance to End Hunger, and is an International Trustee of Religions for Peace. His many leadership roles include chairing the global NGO Impact Initiative on behalf of the office of the UN Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery (President Clinton), and co-founder of the Hope for African Children Initiative (HACI), a partnership of NGOs working to address the impact of AIDS on children. Until recently, he served on HACI's Program Policy Council.

Mr. Worthington has a Masters degree with distinction from the Monterey Institute of International Studies and a Bachelor's degree from the University of Vermont. He also completed post graduate research at the Institut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes Internationales in Geneva and was awarded an Honorary Doctorate of Humanities from Rhode Island College. As a Fulbright Scholar, he analyzed and evaluated United Nations international development program methodologies at the International Labor Office in Switzerland.

Mr. Worthington has represented U.S. non-profits and their programs before the United States Congress and numerous places in the media, including NPR 'Talk of the Nation', the PBS television series "The Visionaries," and all major national and international media outlets.

Mr. Worthington and his wife Renée live with their three children Rachel, Jamie and Lindsay, in Bethesda, Maryland.

MR. MAXIE MCFARLAND

Mr. Maxie L. McFarland was selected to the Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service in July 2002 and is currently serving as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G-2) for the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. In this position, he serves as the Army's lead for analyzing and defining current and future threats and environments in support of future concepts, leader development, capability design, training readiness, and experimentation. He is the Army's lead for Red Teaming, Culture and Language Strategy, Human Terrain System, Foreign Military and Cultural Studies, and the Army's Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Integration Center. Mr. McFarland's team supports the Army's Combat Training Centers, deployed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, Army educational institutions and schools, as well as capability development and integration centers. He is responsible for managing a staff of more than 500 employees, acts as the program manager for the Training and Doctrine Command civilian intelligence career field personnel, and oversees a budget in excess of \$250 million.



From December 2005 to May 2007, Mr. McFarland was assigned by the Army Chief of Staff to support the establishment and expansion of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization. He served as a special advisor to the Director and as the Deputy Director for Concepts, Strategy and Intelligence. Mr. McFarland was responsible for designing the Joint Improved Explosive Device Defeat Organization's Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operational Integration Center (COIC), establishing the law enforcement support program, and overseeing the development of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities to counter Improvised Explosive Device Threats as well as numerous other initiatives.

PANELISTS

Dr. Ruth Beitler

Professor Ruth Margolies Beitler is a Professor of International Relations and Comparative Politics in the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy where she serves as course director for Middle East Politics and Cultural Anthropology. She is the Director of the Conflict and Human Security Studies Program. She is author of two books: *The Fight for Legitimacy: Democracy vs. Terrorism* (coauthored) published by Praeger in 2006 and *The Path to Mass Rebellion: An Analysis of Two Intifadas* published by Lexington Press in June, 2004. She is currently working on a new book entitled, *Women's Roles in the Middle East* to be published by Greenwood Press in 2009. Her manuscript (co-authored with Cindy Jebb), entitled, *Egypt as a Failing State: Implications for U.S. National Security* was published as an occasional paper for the Institute for National Security Studies in July 2003.

A graduate of Cornell University with a BA in Near Eastern Studies, Dr. Beitler holds a Master of Arts of Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, where she also received her Ph.D. in International Relations. She has appeared as a guest commentator on the CBS morning news and MSNBC. She has lived and traveled extensively in the Middle East.

Dr. Reuben Brigety

Reuben E. Brigety, II is the Director of the Sustainable Security Program at American Progress. His work focuses on the role of development assistance in U.S. foreign policy. Dr. Brigety's other areas of expertise are U.S. national security, human rights, and humanitarian affairs. Prior to joining American Progress, he served as a special assistant in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance at the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Brigety is also on leave as an assistant professor of government and politics at George Mason University. He is the author of *Ethics, Technology and the American Way of War* (Routledge, 2007) and a variety of other articles and book chapters. Before entering academia, Brigety was a researcher with the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch. He served on HRW research missions in Afghanistan in March 2002 and in Iraq in April and May of 2003. He also served as HRW's coordinator for crisis management during the Iraq war and as an HRW delegate to the Convention on Conventional Weapons negotiations in Geneva. Before joining HRW, Brigety was an active duty U.S. naval officer and held several staff positions in the Pentagon and in fleet support units.

Brigety is a Distinguished Midshipman Graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, where he earned a B.S. in political science (with merit), served as the brigade commander, and received the Thomas G. Pownall Scholarship. He also holds an M.Phil. and a Ph.D. in international relations from Cambridge University, England. He is a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and a recipient of the council's prestigious International Affairs Fellowship.

Colonel Dominic Caraccilo

Colonel Dominic J. Caraccilo assumed command of the 3rd Brigade Combat Team (187th Infantry Regiment) on 30 November 2006 and deployed to Southern Baghdad for 14 months. Prior to command he held the position of G3/5/7 for the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) serving as the Division Operations Officer for Transformation and the deployment to Multi-National Division-North during Operation Iraqi Freedom from September 2005-September 2006. His next assignment is as the Executive Officer to the Commander of Multi-National Forces-Iraq.

In December 2001 COL Caraccilo assumed command of the newly activated 2nd Battalion (Airborne) 503rd Infantry, 173rd Airborne Brigade, Southern European Task Force in Vicenza, Italy. In January 2003 he deployed the battalion on two back-to-back operational missions; Operation Rapid Guardian in Kosovo and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Northern Iraq. Prior to that, COL Caraccilo served as Special Assistant to the 75th Rangers Regimental Commander and also as the 75th Rangers' Regimental Executive Officer and Regimental Plans Officer. Previous assignments include the Operations Officer (S3) for the 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and the Operations Officer (S3) for 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment at Fort Campbell, Kentucky

COL Caraccilo attended the US Naval Command and Staff Officer's Course in Newport, RI where he received a MA in National Security and Strategic Studies. Prior assignments include assistant professor at the United States Military Academy and variety of command and staff positions in the Continental United States, Germany, Italy, and the Middle East. COL Caraccilo also has a Master of Engineering from Cornell University in Operations Research and Industrial Engineering. He is the author of a number of books and commercial and professional articles to include *Achieving Victory in Iraq: Countering an Insurgency* (Stackpole 2008).

Dr. Thoric Cederstrom

Dr. Thoric Cederstrom is an expert in Sustainable Agriculture and Food Security in conflict and post-conflict environments. He has broad experience in participatory food security assessments, program design, and monitoring and evaluation, including anthropometric surveys of nutrition. As a child, Dr. Cederstrom grew up on a family dairy farm outside Kansas City, Missouri and from this agricultural upbringing has gone on to work extensively in Mexico, Central and South America, the Middle East, Africa, and Central and South Asia and is fluent in Spanish and Portuguese and conversant in Hebrew and Russian. He is learning Arabic.

He is the Senior Advisor for Food and Agriculture at International Relief and Development (www.ird.org), focusing on securing livelihoods and promoting economic development in conflict/post-conflict environments. Thoric travels the globe conducting needs assessments, meeting with international donors, designing new programs, and providing technical support to IRD's numerous projects. He has published extensively on an array of food security topics related to strengthening the linkages between agriculture and nutrition in areas of high HIV/AIDS. Thoric is also an Adjunct Professor in the Applied Anthropology Program at the University of Maryland-College Park. He is a member of the American Anthropological Association, Society for Applied Anthropology, and the Military Anthropology Network.

Dr. Cederstrom is a 1993 graduate of the anthropology program at the University of Arizona in Tucson. His dissertation research was titled “The Potential Impacts of Migrant Remittances on Agriculture Development in the Mixteca Baja Region of Mexico.” He did his Master’s and undergraduate degrees in Puebla, Mexico. He has worked in more than 40 countries, including Iraq, Pakistan, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, Senegal, Mauritania, Ghana, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, and Zambia.

Ms. Sophie Delaunay

Sophie Delaunay became Executive Director of the U.S. section of Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in January 2009.

Delaunay joined MSF-USA in early 2008 as a senior program officer to lead MSF’s advocacy efforts in the U.S. Prior to this position, she worked for 12 years with MSF in various capacities, including country administrator in Thailand and Rwanda, head of mission in China and for MSF’s North Korea program. From 1995 to 1998, she was the administrative and financial director of Epicentre, MSF’s epidemiological research center.

Outside MSF, Delaunay has worked as head of the program department of ESTHER, the French government’s funding agency to combat AIDS in 18 developing countries. She holds a master’s degree in International Business from the University of Le Havre in France and a master’s degree in Political Science from Yonsei University in Seoul, Korea. She has contributed to multiple publications, including a book about North Korean asylum seekers.

Mr. Roland de Marcellus

Roland de Marcellus is Deputy Director of the Office of Development Finance in the State Department's Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs. The office manages the State Department’s interactions with the World Bank and regional development banks and has played the leading role in mobilizing and coordinating post-conflict reconstruction assistance, including for Georgia, Palestinian territories, Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Haiti, and East Timor. Roland has also served as Director of Southern European and Arabian Affairs in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), where his duties involved trade relations with the European Union and the Middle East. Prior to that, he served as Assistant Director of the President's Intelligence Oversight Board and as an intelligence analyst at the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Roland is also a Colonel in U.S. Army Reserves. Mobilized soon after 9/11, he commanded the 489th Civil Affairs battalion in Afghanistan, where his teams scattered throughout the country, implementing over 125 humanitarian infrastructure projects. He also served as a mobilized reserve officer assigned to the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia, where he was the NGO coordinator in Brcko, Bosnia. He also served as a Civil Affairs officer coordinating humanitarian activities in Safwan, Iraq, during Operation Desert Storm. He previously served on active duty in Germany as an Air Defense Artillery officer. He has an MPA in International Affairs from Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School, a Masters in Strategic Studies from the US Army War College, and a BA in Mathematics from the University of Pennsylvania.

Ambassador Eugene Dewey

Gene Dewey's public and private career background cuts across several practitioner disciplines: Military; Diplomatic; United Nations; and Nongovernmental Organizations. In January 2002 President Bush appointed Dewey to the post of Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. He retired in July 2005 after 43 years of public service. In December 2006 Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice appointed Dewey to his current position as the U.S. representative on the International Independent Group of Eminent Persons dealing with human rights violations in Sri Lanka.

From 1996-2001 Dewey was a consultant with Booz-Allen and Hamilton in civil-military training simulations with the military combatant commands in Latin America, Europe, and Asia. He served two years as Professor in Residence at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute at Carlisle, Pennsylvania. He was Founding Director of the Congressional Hunger Center. Following collapse of the Soviet Union, Dewey was named director of the Office of Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to the former Soviet Union. During the Eighties, he served under President Reagan in the State Department as Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau for Refugee Programs. Subsequently he was named a UN Assistant Secretary-General and served four years in Geneva as UN Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees. In his twenty-five years as a military officer, Dewey's assignments ranged from two Vietnam combat aviation assignments – including command of a combat helicopter battalion – to chief of the Army's Political-Military Division in the Pentagon.

Dewey is a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point and received his Masters degree from Princeton University. He was selected as a White House Fellow in 1968, and President Nixon appointed him Director of the President's Commission on White House Fellowships in 1971. Dewey was selected as a Senior Military Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations in New York in 1975. In recognition of more than 43 years of extraordinary public service, the Association of Graduates, U. S. Military Academy, presented Dewey in May 2006 with the West Point Distinguished Graduate Award.

Lieutenant Colonel (P) Kimberly C. Field

Kim Field is an Army Plans, Policy and Strategy Officer and has served in the U.S. Army for 21 years. She joined the S/CRS staff in the summer of 2008 after graduating from the Army War College in Carlisle, PA. Her duties in S/CRS include providing advice and lending assistance to the Coordinator and his interagency staff on DoD matters. She serves as the senior liaison officer between DoD and S/CRS. Through the office of the DASD for Stability Operations, she apprises each agency of pertinent matters, such as office priorities, upcoming meetings and events, S/CRS interaction with DoD organizations, civilian-led planning efforts, and concept development in building civilian capacity.

Prior to attending the War College, Kim's last assignment was Legislative Strategist and Legislative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army. She has also been: Chief of Plans and Strategy at the George C. Marshall European Center; speechwriter for the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Command; Chief of Strategy for the Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force in Kabul, Afghanistan; and Assistant Professor in the Department of Social Sciences at

West Point. Earlier assignments include Military Police platoon leader and company executive officer in Desert Storm-Desert Shield, Military Police Company Commander in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, and Operations Officer, Law Enforcement Command, 10th Mountain Division.

Kim worked with the State Department in 2000-2001. She received an International Affairs Fellowship with the Council on Foreign Relations and served in the U.S. Mission to the United Nations as a Political Advisor. She has a Bachelor's degree from the United States Military Academy, a Masters Degree from the Fletcher School, and a Master of Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College.

Mr. Marc Garlasco

Marc Garlasco, senior military analyst at Human Rights Watch, specializes in battle damage assessment, military operations, and interrogations. Garlasco leads Human Rights Watch's work on civilian military contractors and non-lethal weapons. He has led research teams to Gaza to investigate home demolitions in Rafah, Lebanon to document the use of cluster bombs, and Afghanistan, Iraq, and Georgia to assess the conduct of the war. Garlasco is the co-author of multiple Human Rights Watch reports and has been featured in articles in major American media. Before joining Human Rights Watch, he covered Iraq as a senior intelligence analyst at the Pentagon. Garlasco has a B.A. in government from St. John's University and an M.A. in International Relations from the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University.

Colonel (retired) Robert Gordon

Rob Gordon is currently the Senior Vice President for Civic Leadership and Head of the People and Program Group at City Year, where he oversees the recruitment, selection, education, systematic learning, and training of City Year's 1,500 person youth corps, the continued development of City Year's more than 11,000 alumni as "leaders for life," and the engagement of children and teens in City Year's service and civic leadership initiatives in 19 cities across the United States. He also oversees the Departments of Program and Service, Recruitment, Office of the Dean, Human Resources, and the Department of Evaluation.

From 1992 to 1993 Rob served in the White House as the Director of Special Operations for the Office of National Service. In this position he was a member of the President's staff that founded the AmeriCorps program. Before serving in the White House, he was the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs. As a former Army Colonel and airborne ranger, Rob's 26 year military career included being the aide-de-camp to General Colin Powell, a field commander in artillery, and the Director of American Politics at the United States Military Academy at West Point. He has been twice awarded the Honorable Order of Saint Barbara.

As a social entrepreneur he was a co-founder and the executive director of *Service America*, a program that brought together cadets and AmeriCorps members to serve as tutors, build low income housing, and improve environmental awareness in distressed communities. Rob holds a BS degree from the United States Military Academy, and an MPA in public policy from Princeton University.

2nd Lieutenant Robert Hammond

2LT Robert Hammond is a recent graduate of the United States Military Academy. During his time at the academy, he participated in the Humanitarian and Peacekeeping Operations AIAD in Cambodia as part of West Point's CHSS program. He has branched military intelligence and will be studying at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Nanjing, China for a Masters in International Studies this fall.

Ambassador John Herbst

Ambassador John Herbst currently serves as the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization as a career member of the Senior Foreign Service. He holds the rank of Career-Minister. As Coordinator, Ambassador Herbst is leading the development of U.S. Government civilian capacity to promote the stabilization and reconstruction of societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, and to provide support to countries at risk of instability. In 2007, the Ambassador led the government-wide effort to institutionalize the Interagency Management System (IMS), a whole-of-government system for planning and managing crisis response. The Coordinator is overseeing the establishment of the Civilian Response Corps.

In May 2003, Ambassador Herbst was appointed the U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine. During his tenure, he worked to enhance U.S-Ukrainian relations and to help ensure the conduct of a fair Ukrainian presidential election. In Kyiv, he witnessed the Orange Revolution. Prior to that, Ambassador Herbst was the U.S. Ambassador to Uzbekistan, where he played a critical role in the establishment of an American base to help conduct Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Mr. Herbst previously served as U.S. Consul General in Jerusalem; Principal Deputy to the Ambassador at Large for the Newly Independent States; the Director of the Office of Independent States and Commonwealth Affairs; Director of Regional Affairs in the Near East Bureau; as political counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv and at the Embassies in Moscow and Saudi Arabia. Both the Presidential Distinguished Service Award and the State Department's Distinguished Honor Award were presented to Mr. Herbst.

He received a Bachelor of Science in Foreign Service from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, Phi Beta Kappa, and a Master of Law and Diplomacy, with Distinction, from the Fletcher School. He also attended the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies Bologna Center.

Ms. Sarah Holewinski

Sarah Holewinski is the Executive Director of CIVIC (Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict), an organization working with warring parties to help civilians they have harmed in combat. She began her career as a member of The White House AIDS policy team throughout President Clinton's second term, later joined West Wing Writers—a firm of former White House speechwriters, and has consulted for Human Rights Watch, and the William J. Clinton Foundation. Sarah has worked in India, Rwanda, and has traveled to conflict and post-conflict zones around the world including Iraq, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Kosovo. Sarah received her degree in political theory from Georgetown and Masters in security policy from Columbia University. Sarah is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Colonel Cindy Jebb

Colonel Cindy R. Jebb is Professor and Deputy Head in the Department of Social Sciences. She teaches courses in Comparative Politics, International Security, Cultural Anthropology, and Terrorism and Counterterrorism. Colonel Jebb has served in numerous command and staff positions in the United States and overseas, to include tours with the 1st Armored Division, III Corps, and the National Security Agency. Before reporting to the United States Military Academy, she served as the Deputy Commander of the 704th Military Intelligence Brigade, which supported NSA. During 2000-2001, she served as USMA Fellow at the Naval War College (2000-2001), where she taught the graduate-level course on Strategy and Force Planning, and during 2006-2007, she served as a Visiting Fellow for the Pell Center. She has published several articles and authored/co-authored three books: *Bridging the Gap: Ethnicity, Legitimacy, and State Alignment in the International System*, (Lexington Publisher) ; *Mapping Macedonia: Idea and Identity*, co-authored with P.H. Liotta (Praeger Publisher); and, *The Fight for Legitimacy: Democracy Versus Terrorism*, co-authored with P.H. Liotta, Thom Sherlock, and Ruth Beitler, (Praeger Security International Publisher). Colonel Jebb received a Ph.D. in Political Science from Duke University in 1997, a MA in Political Science from Duke in 1992, an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College in 2000, and a BS from the United States Military Academy in 1982.

Mr. Malcolm Johnson

Mr. Mal Johnson is the Deputy Director of the Interagency Coordination Directorate for NORAD – USNORTHCOM with the mission to facilitate the anticipation, integration and synchronization of interagency activities to ensure mutual understanding and unity of effort for Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities. His responsibilities encompass the development of Military-Civil interagency initiatives encompassing international emergency preparedness and response; unity of effort with the interagency community for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities; collaboration the private sector; and the synchronization of a Joint Interagency Coordination Group during operations.

Mr. Johnson served over 26 years of active military service with assignments alternating between operational field positions and Operations Research and Systems Analysis (ORSA) staff positions. His military experience encompasses all levels up through the service component, joint, and combined environments. He has commanded at the squadron and brigade level. Mr. Johnson was also a Defense Coordination Officer responsible for providing Defense Support to Civil Authorities during a period encompassing the terrorist events of 9/11.

Mr. Michael Khambatta

Michael Khambatta is the Deputy Head of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Regional Delegation for the United States and Canada based in Washington, DC. Previously, he served as Deputy Head of Operations for the Middle East and North Africa (2005-2007) at ICRC headquarters in Geneva. In this position, he covered operations in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iran and Kuwait, including the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah during which he chaired the task force to support the rapid build-up of the ICRC delegation in Lebanon.

His field experience includes Sarajevo (2004-2005) where he was Deputy Head of Delegation and oversaw communications with the media, armed forces, and educational institutions. In Bukavu (2002-2003), he managed ICRC operations for South Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo, which focused on protecting and assisting the conflict-affected population. In Afghanistan (2000-2001), he served as a protection delegate visiting detainees before assuming management of the Jalalabad office covering eastern Afghanistan. Following the events of Sept 11, 2001, he managed the Peshawar sub-delegation, which had responsibility for the North West Frontier Province and for supporting the Afghanistan delegation logistically. Mr. Khambatta began his career with the ICRC in Rwanda in 1999 as a detention delegate, where in addition to visiting detainees, he engaged with local authorities on their conditions and treatment.

Mr. Khambatta has a Master's Degree from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

Mr. Michael Kleinman

Michael is an aid worker, lawyer, and consultant with experience working in Afghanistan, across east and central Africa, and Iraq. From 2004 to 2007 he worked for CARE, first as the organization's Advocacy Advisor in Afghanistan, then covering Sudan, and finally as CARE's Regional Advocacy Advisor for East and Central Africa. He left CARE in early 2007 to take a position with International Relief & Development in Iraq, where he helped manage a USAID-funded employment generational program in Ninewah Province. Prior to going overseas, Michael worked for the Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, providing assistance to the United Nations on the application of International Humanitarian Law to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. He is a graduate of Yale College and Harvard Law School.

Colonel Richard Lacquement

Colonel Richard A. Lacquement Jr., U.S. Army, is Director of Military Strategy at the US Army War College. He is an Army Strategist and Field Artillery officer whose assignments have included U.S. Forces Korea, 82nd Airborne Division, 1st Armored Division (to include Desert Storm), 3rd Infantry Division and the 101st Airborne Division (to include Operation Iraqi Freedom). He has also served as a Strategist in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations where his duties focused on implementation of DoD Directive 3000.05 ("Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations"). He has been an Assistant Professor of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy and a Professor of Strategy and Policy at the U.S. Naval War College. He is a graduate of the United States Military Academy, has a Masters of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College, and a Ph.D. in International Relations from Princeton University. His areas of expertise include professional military education, doctrine, interagency operations, and counterinsurgency. He was the lead author for Chapter 2, "Unity of Effort," in the U.S. Army and Marine Corps FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*. He is the author of the book *Shaping American Military Capabilities After the Cold War* (Praeger, 2003) as well as several articles and book chapters on defense transformation and stability operations.

Ms. Clare Lockhart

Clare Lockhart is co-founder and director of the Institute for State Effectiveness, established in 2005 to discover and share approaches to institution building and state building. In this capacity, she and her colleagues advise Governments, leaders and international organizations on approaches to designing and implementing transformation of institutions from instability to stability. Together with Ashraf Ghani, she published "Fixing Failed States" (Oxford University Press, May 2008) to present an integrated framework for state-building as a method to approach stabilization, reconstruction and institution-building. The Institute is currently creating a set of manuals and guides on how to read context and build each function of the state (for Afghanistan specifically as well as a generic version), an index to measure state functionality, and is guiding leaders and managers, and their international partners, craft approaches to transition in a range of countries from Haiti, Southern Sudan and Somalia to Nepal, Kosovo and Afghanistan.

Clare has recently been called to serve on General Petraeus' Review of the CENTCOM area, and her advice is being sought from the executive and legislative branches of the US Government and other allied governments. From 2001 through 2005, she lived and worked in Afghanistan, first as lawyer on the UN team designing and negotiating the Bonn Agreement (in New York, Bonn and Kabul). She then moved to Afghanistan to work with the core UN team to establish the UN role, help set up the Afghan Cabinet and design its first series of initiatives. She was then seconded to the Afghan Government to establish the AACA and the Afghan budget, Afghanistan Development Forum, National Development Framework, a series of national programs across the economic and security nexus, including National Solidarity Program, and a coordination mechanism for partnership between the Afghan Government and international partners. In this role she worked closely with a team of Afghan leaders and managers, the UN and the diplomatic community. In 2006-7 she returned to Afghanistan as Adviser to General Richards, Commander of ISAF/ NATO.

Dr. Peter Mansoor

Dr. Peter Mansoor, Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired), is the General Raymond Mason Chair of Military History at the Ohio State University. He assumed this position in September 2008 after a 26 year career in the U.S. Army. A 1982 distinguished graduate of the United States Military Academy, Colonel Mansoor served in a variety of command and staff positions in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East during his military career. After relinquishing command, Colonel Mansoor resided at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York as a senior military fellow. He then served as the founding director of the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and also served on the Joint Chiefs of Staff Council of Colonels that reexamined the strategy for the war in Iraq.

Dr. Mansoor holds a Masters and PhD in military history from the Ohio State University, a Masters in Strategic Studies from the Army War College, and a Bachelor of Science degree from the United States Military Academy. He is a lifetime member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the American Legion, Phi Kappa Phi, and Phi Alpha Theta.

Mr. John Marks

John Marks is President and founder of Search for Common Ground, an international conflict prevention NGO headquartered in Washington and Brussels, with offices in 18 countries. He also founded and heads Common Ground Productions, which produces radio and television programming around the world to help prevent and transform conflict. He wrote and produced The Shape of the Future series of TV documentaries, which was aired simultaneously on Israeli, Palestinian, and Arab satellite television - something that had never been done before. He is a best-selling, award-winning author and in 2006 was awarded a Skoll Fellowship for Social Entrepreneurship.

Major General Gregg Martin

Major General Gregg F. Martin has been the Commanding General, U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center and Fort Leonard Wood, since October 9, 2008. During the previous year, he served as the Commandant of the U.S. Army Engineer School and Regiment, and DCG of MANSCEN for Concepts, Doctrine and Organizations. Prior to his arrival at Fort Leonard Wood, General Martin served as the Commander and Division Engineer of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Northwestern Division in Portland, OR, from July 2005 through October 2007; he was also a member of the Mississippi River Commission.

General Martin graduated from the U.S. Military Academy with a bachelor's degree and was commissioned in 1979 into the Army Corps of Engineers. He subsequently earned master's degrees in civil engineering and technology policy, as well as a Ph.D. in engineering management and public policy from MIT. He also graduated from the Naval and Army War Colleges, holding master's degrees in strategic studies from both.

Critical troop leadership positions include: Commanding the 130th Engineer Brigade and serving as the V Corps Engineer in Europe and the Middle East from June 2002 to July 2004. During the first year of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003-2004, he commanded an expanded brigade that conducted full spectrum operations across Iraq. Other commands include the 5th Engineer Battalion at Fort Leonard Wood, MO; and B Company, 79th Engineer Battalion in Karlsruhe, Germany. As a lieutenant, he was a Platoon Leader and Company Executive Officer with the 94th Engineer Battalion in Darmstadt, Germany. Staff assignments include positions in U.S. Army Europe, Germany, Honduras, and Fort Lewis, WA. Leader Development and Education assignments include: Director of Senior Command and Leadership at the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, PA; and Assistant Professor in the Department of Social Sciences, as well as Recruiting/Admissions Officer at the U.S. Military Academy.

Major Angelica Martinez

MAJ Angelica R. Martinez teaches International Relations in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point. She received her commission in the US Army in 2000 after attending Virginia Military Institute where she earned a BA in International Studies.

From 2000-2004 she served in the 3D Corps Support Command in Mannheim, Germany and deployed to the Balkans in support of peacekeeping operations, to Poland in support of NATO exercises, and to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. After completing the Captain's

Career Course she was assigned to Fort Irwin, California where she commanded the 699th Maintenance Company and deployed again in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

In 2008 she earned a MA in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Prior to reporting to West Point to teach International Relations, she took seven cadets to Cape Coast, Ghana to work for a small NGO called Women in Progress. Next year she will teach a course entitled, "Winning the Peace". She is married to Captain Timothy Joyce, USMC.

Ms. Donna McAleer

Donna McAleer's professional career includes a variety of roles in public, private and not-for-profit corporations. She recently completed *Porcelain on Steel: Women of West Point Long Gray Line*, a compelling and cleverly crafted collection of biographies of West Point female graduates which will be published in 2010. Donna graduated West Point in 1987 and served in Germany. Donna left the military to pursue an MBA at the Darden Graduate School of the University of Virginia.

She began her professional career with the Novations Consulting Group, later moving to Mercer Consulting Group. Donna then became a Vice President of Global Logistics and Support Services at GenRad. While at GenRad, Donna was responsible for the development and implementation of a global logistics and customer support strategy. In February 2000, she resigned her position at GenRad and moved to Park City, Utah, to begin an intensive training regimen. For the better part of two years, she committed herself to represent the United States in the 2002 Winter Olympic Games in the medal debut of Women's Bobsled. Donna then became the Executive Director of the People's Health Clinic, a non-profit organization based in Park City, Utah. In this capacity she led strategic business model transition and financial turnaround to create financial stability for this organization's commitment to providing quality medical and healthcare for the uninsured.

Donna helped to initiate the incorporation of *Journey's within Our Community*, a nonprofit to assist a school and orphanage in Siem Reap, Cambodia. She serves on their board of directors. She also serves on the Board of Directors for several not-for-profit organizations including: Professional Ski Instructors of America – Intermountain Division, West Point Association of Graduates, and West-Point.org.

Colonel Michael Meese

Colonel Michael J. Meese is a Professor, U.S. Military Academy, and Head of the Department of Social Sciences at West Point. He teaches economics and national security courses and leads the 70 military and civilian faculty members in the Department and the Combating Terrorism Center who teach political science, economics, and terrorism-related courses. He has served in Iraq as a senior policy advisor to the Commanding General on three recent occasions: from January-March 2009 to assist General Odierno and Ambassador Crocker as the Obama Administration developed its plan for Iraq; from June to September 2007 to assist in General Petraeus's assessment, recommendations, and testimony concerning Iraq; and from January-March 2007, to assist in the development of the campaign plan for "the surge." In 2004-05, he served as the Executive Director of the Secretary of the Army's Transition Team. He has also

assisted with the evaluation of and transformation of the South African National Defense Force. Colonel Meese has written extensively on defense economics, terrorism, and national security issues. He also serves on the Defense Science Board Panel on Improvised Explosive Devices.

He is a field artillery officer with previous assignments with the 101st Airborne Division in Mosul, Iraq, with the Stabilization Force Headquarters in Bosnia-Herzegovina conducting peacekeeping and counterterrorism operations, and with other units in Germany and the United States. A member of the Council on Foreign Relations, he is a graduate of the National War College, Command and General Staff College, U.S. Military Academy, and holds a Ph.D., MPA and an M.A. from Princeton University.

Mr. Robert Perito

Robert M. Perito is a senior program officer in the Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations. He is the coordinator of the Peacekeeping Lessons Learned Project and the Haiti Working Group. He came to USIP in 2001 as a senior fellow in the Jennings Randolph Fellowship program. Before joining the Institute, Perito was a Foreign Service officer with the U.S. Department of State, retiring with the rank of minister-counselor. He served as deputy executive secretary of the National Security Council (1988-1989). He was a congressional fellow in 1980. Perito received a Presidential Meritorious Service Award in 1990 for leading the U.S. delegation in the Angola peace talks.

Perito served as deputy director of the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program at the U.S. Department of Justice, which trained police in international peace operations. He was a Peace Corps volunteer and served as a rural development officer in Nigeria.

Perito has taught at Princeton, American and George Mason universities. He holds a B.A. in international relations from Denver University and an M.A. in peace operations policy from George Mason University.

Colonel Jeffrey Peterson

COL Jeffrey D. Peterson is an Academy Professor of Economics in the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy and responsible for West Point's Economics program. He was commissioned into the Army from West Point in 1987 as an Armor officer with a BS in Civil Engineering. As an armor officer, he served in a variety of leadership and staff positions in the United States, Korea, Cuba, and the Middle East. Most recently, he served as the commander for a cavalry squadron based at Ft. Lewis, WA. While in command, the squadron deployed to Baghdad, Iraq and conducted counterinsurgency operations from July 2006 to September 2007 during the height of sectarian violence in Baghdad and the beginning of the "surge." His experience in using economics as part of an overall plan to establish stability in his area of responsibility motivated his desire to research the military's role in economic development in a post-conflict environment and the importance of economics as a component of successful counterinsurgency operations.

He holds an MBA from the MIT Sloan School of Management and a PhD in Policy Analysis from the Pardee RAND Graduate School. He has contributed to various RAND publications concerning military leader development for the contemporary operating environment, the applications of networked capabilities in low-intensity contingency operations, and the effects of personnel stabilization on unit performance.

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Senior Conference XLVI
Bridging the Cultural Divide: NGO-Military Relations in Complex Environment¹
By Major Mark J. Crow

“In recent years the lines separating war, peace, diplomacy, and development have become more blurred, and no longer fit the neat organizational charts of the 20th century. All the various elements and stakeholders working in the international arena – military and civilian, government and private – have learned to stretch outside their comfort zone to work together and achieve results.”
– U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, 15 July 2008

Introduction

Since the late 17th century, the Peace of Westphalia and its subsequent norms privileged the sovereignty of states in the international system. The strength of this tradition grew over time and reached a zenith during the 20th century as the United States and the Soviet Union “waged” a Cold War. Both superpowers were generally unwilling to overtly challenge these rules of international sovereignty because of the polarized nature of the international system, the zero-sum arithmetic that applied to allies and enemies, and the overwhelming threat nuclear weapons posed to the system’s survival. However, the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the rise of globalization led to the ascendancy of transnational issues such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, poverty, and migration. As a result, international norms of state, territorial-based sovereignty were weakened, particularly in fragile and failing countries, where negative consequences of state failure threatened regional and global stability. This trend in international norms is also reflected in the United Nation’s *Responsibility to Protect* doctrine and a rebalancing in focus away from the security of the state toward the security of individuals (i.e., human security).¹ This shift in emphasis is also present in U.S. strategic thought, reflected in the National Security Strategy of 2002 which state, “America is now threatened less by conquering states than by failing ones.”² In fact, containing transnational security issues and recognizing the human security imperative is becoming a *casus belli* itself – a reason for intervening through military and humanitarian operations.

Accompanying these trends was an increase in the number and scale of operations by the U.S. military; many of these were operations for which the U.S. military has not traditionally prepared and may not necessarily be comfortable with (i.e., peacekeeping and peace-enforcement duties).³ At the same time, the U.S. foreign aid and development agency staffs and budgets were reduced (in real terms and as a proportion of GDP) as the ideological battle for “political hearts and minds” in the Cold War ended.⁴ This decrease in official development assistance budgets resulted in a “vacuum left by civilian agencies, which struggled to deploy adequate numbers of personnel and to deliver assistance in insecure environments, in addition to chronic under-investment by the United States in non-military instruments.”⁵ The balance between the three primary U.S. actors in the international arena (U.S. military, U.S. civilian government agencies,

¹ This article is a draft for discussion. It is meant to provide a balanced and neutral analysis with candid criticism of both communities. The article does not provide policy prescriptions or operational recommendations, but is a framing document to provide proper background and context to generate vigorous academic debate. To that end, it is not presented to Senior Conference participants as *the definitive survey*, but instead, *one perspective* on this important relationship. Finally, the views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Army, or the United States Military Academy at West Point.

and non-governmental organizations) changed, and the result was a shift in U.S. foreign policy. The responsibility for humanitarian and development assistance partially shifted in two directions; on one hand, the U.S. military filled some of this gap, particularly in hostile or non-permissive environments where the military and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are most likely to encounter each other. On the other hand, NGOs and International Organizations (IO) also stepped in as staff cuts at development agencies led to a greater reliance on NGOs and aid contractors to implement assistance programs.

An unintended consequence of this adjustment was increasing interaction of two unlikely partners: NGOs and the U.S. military as actors in fragile and failing states. The U.S. military rediscovered its role in relief and reconstruction due to the U.S. Government's (USG) renewed focus on conflict prevention and human security. Thus, the U.S. military found itself conducting low-intensity stability and support operations in a number of countries in the 1990s quickly followed by combat, counterinsurgency, and stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001. In many of these places, the military encountered NGOs that were already established actors and, in some cases, had been working on humanitarian issues in the region for two generations or more. The nature of the interaction between NGOs and the military changed, in hindsight, from one of relatively straightforward co-existence in the 1990s to a relationship complicated by overlapping mandates, a volatile security environment, competition, and in some cases, antagonism. Yet, because these two entities are extremely important external actors in fragile or failing states, they have much to gain from a *sustained, methodical, and purposeful* discourse. Even if their respective goals and motives differ, the potential for improved cooperation exists in the realms of conflict prevention and human security. This improved interaction can better support both NGOs' development goals and American foreign policy and security objectives.

It is important to acknowledge up front that the goal of this paper is not to bring the two communities closer together, establish formal modes of cooperation, or develop a deeper friendship. Rather, the goal of this paper is to candidly examine the NGO-U.S. military relationship and challenge its underlying assumptions in an effort to contribute to a sustained and purposeful dialogue between the two communities. Fortunately, both communities recognize the long-term benefits of critical introspection and self-criticism. Thus, this paper leverages these and other criticisms to facilitate a forthright examination of the salient challenges facing NGOs and the military in complex security environments.

The paper first defines the concept of a Non-Governmental Organization and its many variants. This is important because it is very difficult (and sometimes counterproductive) to generalize about the overall community due to the diversity in NGO mission, size, funding, scope and organization. Because "words" do matter, the second section of the paper briefly clarifies terminology and concepts to clearly establish a common ground for discussion and analysis. The third section examines the characteristics of each community by highlighting the key similarities and differences between NGOs and the military. While there are certainly organizational and cultural differences that burden this relationship, many important similarities exist that can increase mutual understanding. The paper then looks at the effects of the current strategic and operating environment on the U.S. military to identify potential challenges in the NGO-military relationship. In particular, it looks at the military's evolving role in relief and reconstruction as the primary focal point for NGO-military friction. In the fifth section, the paper considers the same effects of the strategic and operational environment, but analyzes their impact on NGOs by primarily focusing on the principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality to determine the universal applicability of these imperatives as reason for distance from the

military. Finally, the paper reviews the current status of the relationship and identifies areas for future discussion and research.

What is an NGO?

Although NGOs have existed for over 150 years and have become a permanent fixture in the international community in the last two decades, there is still significant confusion in security, foreign policy, and humanitarian circles as to what a NGO is, what a NGO does, and why they do what they do. NGOs have their roots in organizations developed in association with the creation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in the nineteenth century.⁶ Precursors to today's NGOs also played prominent roles in slavery abolition, women's suffrage, international labor conventions, and other prominent policy and social issues. The rise of many of today's prominent and large NGOs (CARE, Save the Children, International Rescue Committee) was a response to the civilian human suffering during and following World War II. A second and much more intense period of NGO growth occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s as the Cold War ended and the prominence and frequency of international humanitarian crises and interventions increased; there were approximately 1000 NGOs in existence prior to the start of World War I and, as of 2005, that number has increased to over 45,000.⁷

Fundamentally, an NGO is a "self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering by promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, conflict resolution and encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society."⁸ In looking at the community as a whole, Katarina West described it, "like a pyramid that has a few big multinational NGOs at the top, thousands of small, local NGOs at the bottom and a number of medium-sized NGOs in the middle."⁹ Furthermore, many large NGOs are organizationally aligned with both an international headquarters and country-specific organizations -- each with their own distinct policies and perspectives (Save the Children, Médecins Sans Frontières, Oxfam, etc.).

At the most general level, NGOs can be grouped into one of two categories, depending on their primary function: operational or advocacy.¹⁰ In this construct, Operational NGOs focus on the delivery of goods and social services to local populations in need. In contrast, Advocacy NGOs focus on raising awareness regarding specific issues by lobbying governments and international organizations and educating the public directly through the media.¹¹ In reality, this distinction is often blurred as many NGOs, particularly large, international ones, conduct a broad spectrum of activities that can be construed as both operational and advocacy.¹² A more specific and useful typology of NGOs is found in *United States Institute for Peace (USIP) Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations*, which groups NGOs into four major categories by organizational focus: humanitarian assistance, human rights, civil-society and democracy building, and conflict resolution."¹³ Within these categories, NGOs can conduct both operational activities in the field while at the same time advocating for specific issues to home governments and foreign capitals.

While the NGO community is large and diverse, there are national and international umbrella organizations (or NGO coalitions) that endeavor to represent many of the common concerns and positions of the NGO community. In the United States, the largest of these national coalitions is the American Council for Voluntary International Action (InterAction), a coalition of over 170 NGOs focused primarily on poverty alleviation. In addition, the Alliance for Peacebuilding is a U.S. NGO coalition representing NGOs focused on conflict resolution and peace-building. The Canadian Council for International Co-operation plays a similar role in

Canada, and in Europe, the Voluntary Organisation for Cooperation in Emergencies (VOICE) and the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) coordinate and represent European humanitarian NGOs. At the international level, a number of broad NGO coalitions exist, including the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR), the International Council for Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) and the United Nations Interagency Standing Committee (IASC). While none of these coalitions purport to speak exclusively for the NGO communities they represent, they provide exposure and a focal point for important humanitarian issues.

Words Matter: Definitions and Concepts in the NGO-Military Relationship

A discourse about NGO-military interaction is complicated by a wide array of competing frames, terminologies, and concepts that apply to the entire spectrum of conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction, development assistance, and foreign aid. Because “words” do matter, it is useful to take a moment to clarify some of the more important terms and concepts.

At the most general level, there are different and parallel definitions regarding the provision of assistance to foreign populations. The military act of providing this support to foreign countries is referred to as “relief and reconstruction” activities while the actual assistance is

Military Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA)
<i>Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas</i>
<i>Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems</i>
<i>Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities</i>
<i>Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.</i>

defined as “humanitarian and civic assistance” (HCA).¹⁴ This assistance is specifically authorized by Title 10, United States Code, Section 401.¹⁵ HCA, provided under the aegis of relief and reconstruction activities, is generally conducted as part of Stability and Support Operations (SASO).

On the other hand, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and most humanitarian organizations use “development assistance” and “humanitarian assistance” (collectively “foreign aid”) as two separate and distinct concepts.¹⁶ Development assistance is designed to foster long-term sustainable broad-based economic progress and social stability in developing countries whereas humanitarian assistance is provided for the immediate alleviation of humanitarian emergencies during and after natural or man-made disasters or conflict.¹⁷

In terms of conceptual frameworks, there are also competing paradigms across the communities. Fundamentally, one can think in temporal terms such as “pre-conflict” and “post-conflict” operations, such as the traditional military campaign planning sequence that currently proceeds through six sequential phases.¹⁸ Moreover, the U.S. Department of State’s (DoS) Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) utilizes a Post Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks Matrix organized around six sectors: security, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, economic stabilization and infrastructure, and governance and participation.¹⁹ Likewise, the State Department’s own USAID utilizes a slightly different and more general framework in their 2005 Fragile States Strategy; USAID focuses on security, social, economic and political sectors.²⁰ Finally, in a promising display of interagency synchronization, the U.S. Army’s recently updated Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations*, adopts the same theoretical construct for its Stability Sectors, as does the S/CRS Essential Task Matrix.²¹

The frameworks discussed above are part of the beginning of an evolution in U.S. government security policy known as a “whole of government approach” (WGA) or the “3Ds” of Development, Diplomacy, and Defense.²² This transformation is part of a larger effort to

rebalance the USG approach to national security by emphasizing the non-military components (Diplomacy and Development) of U.S. government capabilities. While viewed by many in the USG as an important and overdue first step, many in the NGO community are wary of just such a change. Some see the whole of government approach as an example of the cure being worse than the disease. Currently, NGOs recognize that the lack of adequate U.S. government civilian capacity for operations in fragile states does potentially hamper progress. However, the NGO community is equally concerned that moving to a whole of government approach could subsume USAID and DoS into the objectives of the Department of Defense (DoD) due to its disproportionate size, resources, and traditional influence with Congress (the proverbial “800lb gorilla” in the policy room). Furthermore, because the whole of government approach is generally accepted as a framework for strengthening national security, NGOs are extremely reluctant to use it, or, more importantly, view themselves as a component within it. Additionally, NGOs even remain reluctant to embrace concepts as broad-based as “whole of society” or “whole of community” approaches. Why is this? Any acceptance of a partnership, relationship, or cooperation between the USG and NGOs in pursuit of ends other than humanitarian assistance is viewed by some NGOs as compromising their impartiality and neutrality. This challenges not only their fundamental operating principles in the abstract, but also potentially their physical security in the field.

As independent organizations, NGOs do not have a universally accepted overarching framework within which they operate. The various national and international NGO coalitions such as InterAction or VOICE provide some level of leadership and coordination; however, there are very few efforts at common policy-making.²³ This can be attributed to the diverse nature of the NGO community that tends not to primarily view their humanitarian and development work as a means to a security or stability end. More simply, the general lack of doctrine or coherent policy-making within the community also tends to inhibit the development of such a construct. The closest the NGO community comes to adopting an overarching framework is an informal reliance on an “event-centric” perspective organized along a spectrum of hostility/permissiveness that begins with peacetime and moves toward combat.²⁴ In addition, NGOs specifically reference disaster-response and relief as one area (presumably within the peacetime portion of the spectrum) where military involvement in humanitarian assistance is generally more acceptable, particularly if specific military resources are considered a necessary part of the response; e.g., the Navy’s hospital ship Comfort or general sea-lift and air-lift capacities. This is because in disaster relief, the military and NGOs share a common means and end: to alleviate human suffering for humanitarian sake. Again, this contrasts with much of the military’s HCA work in conflict or non-permissive areas, where the NGO and military means are the same (development assistance), but the ends diverge significantly (humanitarian objectives vs. political/security objectives).

The Actors: Non-Governmental Organizations and the U.S. Military

While the focus of this paper is the relationship between the U.S. military and U.S.-based NGOs, the larger universe in which humanitarian assistance, development and state-building takes place is also important. Larry Minnear and Tom Weiss, in *Mercy Under Fire: War and Global Humanitarian Community*, provide a useful construct for framing the myriad actors involved in complex environments. They divide the actors according to their origin as either outside or inside the state in which they are operating.²⁵ Each of these actors play a different, but still significant role in the current set of international interventions and conflicts, and the relationships between and among each of them are important to the success of any humanitarian or state-based intervention.

Division of Actors	
Outside Actors	Inside Actors
<i>UN System</i>	<i>Host Government Agencies</i>
<i>Bilateral State Agencies</i>	<i>Armed Opposition Forces</i>
<i>ICRC & IFRC</i>	<i>Local NGOs</i>
<i>Foreign Military Forces</i>	
<i>International NGOs</i>	

The focus of this paper, however, is primarily on the *outside* actors, specifically, U.S. - based international NGOs and U.S. military land forces operating abroad. This narrows the analysis to a manageable level but in no way diminishes the importance (or challenges) of the complex relationships among foreign military forces, domestic military forces, United Nations organizations, and international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Any analysis of the relationship between NGOs and the U.S. military would be incomplete without an examination of the fundamental characteristics of each entity. While the focus of this comparison is *between* NGOs and the military, it is equally important to note neither community is monolithic.²⁶ At a base level, both communities tend to vary primarily by purpose and goal; as mentioned before, NGOs tend to be classified according to their focus on humanitarian assistance, advocacy, societal development, or conflict resolution whereas U.S. military forces all focus on national security and are more easily classified by the medium within which they are trained to operate (land, sea, and air). There are also significant differences between the organizations such as culture, values, and available resources.²⁷ This section identifies the similarities and differences between communities to provide a more comprehensive understanding of each actor in the relationship.

Differences

There are six fundamental differences between NGOs and the military. The U.S. military works directly for the U.S. government and operates in pursuit of political objectives determined by the civilian leadership in the Executive and Legislative branches. In the broadest sense, “the U.S. military is one of several instruments of national policy maintained to help shape the international political environment in support of U.S. interest.”²⁸ More narrowly, “the fundamental purpose of the military is to deter or wage war in support of national policy,” but it “may be employed in more benign ways for a variety of important purposes across a wide range of situations.”²⁹ In regards to conducting HCA, humanitarian objectives serve as intermediate means to U.S. political and strategic ends.³⁰ This is perhaps the most important point to understand in the NGO-military relationship. The military

NGO and Military Differences
<i>Government relationships & organizational purpose</i>
<i>Organizational cultures & hierarchy</i>
<i>Training and doctrine</i>
<i>Financial resources</i>
<i>Indigenous resources</i>
<i>Planning and operations horizon</i>

has national policy motives for conducting HCA while many NGOs focus on the humanitarian motive.

Organizationally, the military culture is based on formal planning and decision-making paradigms, comfort with the use of force, and compartmentalization of information based on need-to-know and security concerns. The military's hierarchy is vertical, and power flows from centralized decision-making centers (commanders). The military conducts vast amounts of pre-, during, and post-deployment training and evaluation that is based on volumes of formally developed policy and doctrine. The U.S. military's financial resources are significant, accounting for nearly half of global defense spending, and totaling over \$600 billion in 2008.³¹ More importantly, the military's share of USG development assistance rose to over 20 percent from 3 percent in the early part of this decade.³² The military often contracts for indigenous firms, personnel, and resources to implement its assistance activities and for administrative support, but, in contrast to NGOs, the military rarely, if ever, uses private citizens from the local community to manage its local operations.³³ Finally, the military's planning and operational time horizon is directly impacted by the length of its operational deployments and is characteristically short-term in nature.

On the other hand, NGOs are formed from civil society and are separate from the USG. To reiterate the point from above, most NGOs believe their organizational missions are not guided by political objectives, but rather, the humanitarian imperative to relieve suffering wherever it is found. Regarding organizational culture, NGOs conduct less formal planning, operate based on consensus rather than direction and, in general, the type of person drawn to work for an NGO will be much less comfortable with the use of force. NGOs generally conduct much of their training "on-the-job" and have little formal doctrine to guide their actions.³⁴ NGO financial resources are constrained by their ability to raise funds from private donors and their ability and willingness to accept funds from government agencies such as USAID and DoS. However, NGOs are extremely adept at using indigenous resources not only for administrative staff, but also as their principal operations personnel in many foreign countries. Moreover, NGOs have a propensity to operate with a longer time horizon than does the military because of their indigenous staff, tendency to rely on personal relationships, and focus on providing for long-term development needs.

Commonalities

While the differences between NGOs and the military tend to generate the most controversy, there are several commonalities between NGOs and the military that, once acknowledged, might serve to increase mutual levels of understanding and help mitigate personal apprehension. These commonalities all fundamentally relate to the type of individual drawn to serve in the U.S. military or with an NGO. Individuals in both communities have dedicated their lives to some form of service. Moreover, by necessity of their respective operational environments and organizational mandates, these same individuals tend to be physically courageous, mission-focused, and comfortable living in austere conditions. As part of this, they both generally endure long separations from loved ones during the course of their careers and have the benefit of engagement with foreign cultures which helps to engender an international perspective.

NGO and Military Commonalities
<i>Culture of service</i>
<i>Physical courage</i>
<i>Mission focus</i>
<i>International perspective</i>
<i>Culture of service</i>
<i>Physical courage</i>

In the broadest sense, the differences between the two groups reside primarily at the organizational level, while the similarities tend to be at the individual level. This is promising because it suggests that differences arise from social and structural constructions and not necessarily the natural conditions of the security environment. Thus, while these tensions may exist, the need for cooperation remains in fragile and failing states and it is possible the effect of the current operating environment is rendering the two communities differences less problematic than traditionally thought.

The U.S. Military and Contemporary Challenges in Complex Environments

The involvement of the military and NGOs in complex security environments is not without controversy. Indeed, some of the loudest criticism of each community comes from within those communities themselves. To facilitate understanding and stimulate discussion, this section regarding the military and the next section regarding NGOs attempt to capture the challenges that each face today.

It is the military's role (and performance) in humanitarian and civic assistance that lies at the center of the discussion (and discord) regarding the interaction of the military and NGOs in developing and post-conflict countries around the world. As recently recognized by Reuben Brigety of the Center for American Progress, the "increasing involvement of the U.S. armed forces in addressing the basic human needs of civilians abroad represents one of the most profound changes in U.S. strategic thought and practice in at least a generation."³⁵ This section will briefly review the military's adaptation to this new role before it analyzes challenges to the military's effectiveness.

Policy and Doctrine Changes

A review of recent Presidential, Department of Defense, and Department of State policy initiatives illustrates this change in strategic thought: there is an increase in the amount and scope of formal directives, guidelines, and doctrine regarding the military's role in humanitarian and civic assistance. The National Security Strategy of 2002, which emphasizes weak and failing states as threats, captures the strategic perspective most directly. Moreover, Department of Defense Directives and Armed Forces Joint Publications also contain similar strains of thought. For the military's ground forces, this evolution in thought culminates in U.S. Army operational doctrine such as the recently revised Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations*.³⁶ This flurry of policy and doctrinal activity is an implicit recognition by the U.S. government that the international security environment has changed, and there is now a more urgent benefit in development work for preventing conflict and furthering U.S. foreign policy goals, given the potential consequences of inattention to specific countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, etc).

Organizational Changes

In addition to policy and doctrine, the U.S. Government has begun to operationally innovate in the way it responds to unstable and fragile states. It has begun to combine its civilian foreign assistance and military humanitarian and civic assistance capacities through its regional Combatant Commands (COCOM) at the operational level (AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM, specifically) and with Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Iraq and Afghanistan at the tactical level.

At the combatant command level, AFRICOM has the Department of Defense's regional lead in promoting "a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy."³⁷ This approach to Africa's security and stability uniquely blends civilian and military personnel expertise in a unified military command. In an unprecedented organizational construct,

Ambassador Mary Carlin Yates is the Deputy to the AFRICOM Commander for Civil-Military Activities and is responsible for directing the commander's civil-military planning and programs, with emphasis on aligning AFRICOM's activities with that of other USG departments and agencies.³⁸ From the perspective of the USG pursuing a unified foreign policy, this development is a promising one. The assignment of non-DoD civilians to positions in AFRICOM clearly indicates a desire on the part of DoD to synchronize its activities with other agencies, and an interest on the part of other agencies to help influence how DoD operates. However, all of these non-DoD civilians serve only as detailees or liaison officers—they do not bring any of their home agency authority to decide or act in the non-military realm. Moreover, for NGOs, there is concern about “whether the Department of Defense is ‘getting out of its lane by usurping the role of USAID and other non-military agencies and infringing on the humanitarian and development space’ that various NGOs occupy in Africa.”³⁹ Another prominent NGO states that “the main concern of NGOs...is the militarization of humanitarian action. [We] cannot be supportive of...AFRICOM as long as it portends to be a humanitarian actor and promises to subsume humanitarianism within the ambit of military strategy.”⁴⁰ Yet, in defense of AFRICOM's goals and mission, General Kip Ward recently clarified AFRICOM's role on the continent, reassuring “a growing number of skeptics...that the U.S. military is not in charge of foreign policy or development in Africa.”⁴¹ Understandably, there is much consternation on the part of the NGO community with AFRICOM even though it is not yet fully operational and engaged on the continent.

While AFRICOM is less than a year old, PRTs have been used at the tactical level for over 6 years, with the first PRTs being established in Afghanistan in 2002.⁴² In early 2005, the PRT concept spread to Iraq and resulted in over 35 teams operating in the two theaters of operations. PRTs are small civil-military organizations focused on governance, security, and reconstruction issues. However, they face many of the same criticisms as the newly created AFRICOM does in respect to their development activities. Specifically, the use of Quick Impact Projects (see below) by PRTs to win the “hearts and minds” of the local populace is often met with stiff resistance by the NGO community. NGOs feel that the military is “pushing beyond its traditional security mandate to provide humanitarian, development and reconstruction assistance.”⁴³ The interaction of PRTs and NGOs has also highlighted the military's overestimation of the NGO community's willingness to cooperate and participate with the military, specifically in regards to development work. Heretofore, the presence of civilians within the PRT and a focus on development has not provided sufficient reason for the NGO community to put aside their concern for impartiality and neutrality to work with the military (especially in hostile environments).

Military's Time Horizon

Not surprisingly, the NGO community takes significant issue with this enlargement of the military's purview and focus. From the NGO's perspective, the military's role in development is hampered by a number of issues. First, the military generally has a short-term development horizon, which can largely be attributed to three interrelated factors: the expeditionary and rotational nature of military personnel/units, the fact that the time horizon is tied to the security situation (i.e., the sooner the context is benign, the sooner the military can strategically exit), and the military's lack of core competencies in development assistance. With the exception of a small number of specialized personnel in the civil affairs career field, most military leaders lack genuine development training and competencies. From the military and often indigenous perspective, the NGO time horizon is too slow, as NGO workers in the field must seek funding and approvals for their projects.

Monitoring and Evaluation

A second issue concerns the lack of sufficient and appropriate monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of humanitarian assistance and development projects.⁴⁴ Without empirical data from an effective M&E program, it is nearly impossible to assess and then justify the continued development work of any organization, be it military or otherwise. This is a crucial point for many in the NGO community, as they contend the cost-effectiveness of the military's development assistance is low and inefficient when compared to similarly provided NGO or IGO assistance. Unfortunately, there is little empirical data to point to one way or the other. For the military, this lack of sufficient M&E can be attributed to the aforementioned factors, in addition to being complicated by the often political and strategic ends for which the military is conducting such assistance. When the military is conducting development assistance activities primarily to win "hearts and minds" in pursuit of a greater security objective, the M&E of any particular project is less important than a decrease in violence or increase in stability in a given area or region.

Funding

Many in both the policy and the NGO community are also uneasy with the military's access to and use of funding for development and humanitarian assistance. The speed and relative bureaucratic ease with which the military can disburse the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) Funds is regarded by the military as a primary strength of the program. However, many in the NGO community view this speedy disbursement as exacerbating the haste with which the military plans and executes development assistance projects in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, NGOs are very concerned about the use of the relatively new "1207/1210 funds" by USAID and the Department of State.⁴⁵ They fear both the militarization of U.S. development aid and the potential instrumentalization of USAID for security purposes.⁴⁶

The above NGO concerns are exemplified in the military's propensity for conducting Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) in Iraq and Afghanistan. QIPs are small-scale short-term projects aimed at pacifying local populations and building trust.⁴⁷ They are generally undertaken by PRTs and use quick-disbursing funds to complete the project. In addition to the above concerns regarding time horizon, funding, haste, development competency, and monitoring and evaluation, NGOs also criticize QIPs for a lack of project coordination that leads to constant overlap with other development actors in the area. Lastly, QIPs are commonly chided by development experts for "failing to take the longer-term development implications and sustainability questions into account."⁴⁸

Non-Governmental Organizations and Contemporary Challenges in Complex Environments

Just as the military has had challenges adapting to its new-found role in humanitarian and civic assistance, NGOs have had to adapt not only to the increasing presence of the military, but also to the increasingly complex nature of failing, failed or post-conflict states. This has led to significant discussion within the existing NGO and academic literature of the challenges to NGOs with regard to their principles, performance and accountability, funding and formalization, and politics. Just as the criticisms discussed earlier regarding the military's role in complex security environments were not meant to be inflammatory, such is the case with the following section. It summarizes the recent literature to draw out the relevant challenges facing the NGO community in fragile and failing states and how it affects their relationship with the U.S. military.

NGO Principles

Non-Governmental Organizations generally adhere to the principles laid out in the “Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief.”⁴⁹ Notwithstanding the title of this code, NGOs tend to bind themselves to this document in all environments, to include not only disaster relief, but more generally permissive and non-permissive development situations. The overarching premise of this document provides for three primary principles that guide NGOs in their work; they are the humanitarian imperative, independence, and impartiality. The *Humanitarian Imperative* ensures that NGOs are motivated solely by a desire to alleviate human suffering wherever it is found. *Independence* ensures that NGOs do not act as instruments of government foreign policy for non-humanitarian purposes. Finally, the principle of *Impartiality* ensures NGOs provide assistance according to need without regard to race, religion, nationality, or political affiliation.⁵⁰ For their security in semi- or non-hostile environments, NGOs rely primarily on their perceived impartiality in the conflict around them to ensure their own safety. This imperative is primarily responsible for the distance NGOs maintain from the U.S. military in such environments, although, the “need for a clear separation between the military and the aid establishments are by no means as clear-cut on the ground as they are in ‘meeting-room discussions’.”⁵¹ It is also important to bear in mind the perception of impartiality and neutrality as perceived through the eyes of local actors on the ground. Although in some “settings local people differentiate among international actors, they are generally more concerned with what is being provided than with who are the chosen agents of assistance and protection.”⁵² As a consequence, it is necessary to acknowledge that the evolving character of non-state threats in non-permissive environments may be changing the nature of this imperative. NGO concerns about maintaining impartiality and neutrality while interacting with the military may be less significant in environments and amongst actors that view any western actor as partial and non-neutral due to social values, ethnic background, or religious affiliation. Thus, the delegitimization of the pillars of independence and impartiality may not be due to NGO interaction with the military but, rather, caused by changes in the threat environment of fragile and failing states.

The ICRC document specifically, and the NGO community more broadly, are generally silent regarding this possibility. In fact, the ICRC Code of Conduct, updated in 1996, is primarily focused on NGO operations as they relate to environments primarily dominated by state actors. For example, the document contains three annexes that describe the relationship between NGOs and host governments, donor governments, and intergovernmental organizations, but largely avoids the issue of transnational actors such as terrorists or religious extremists.⁵³ In this regard, perhaps the NGO community may not fully acknowledge the threats extant in the current international environment.

Performance and Accountability

This challenge is closely related to a charge often leveled against the military; compared to their own stated goals, NGO performance and effectiveness is often substandard, specifically as it relates to cost-effectiveness, sustainability, and popular participation in their humanitarian and assistance work.⁵⁴ Importantly, the level of their performance and effectiveness can potentially create security challenges for the U.S. military operating in the same area. Specifically, studies indicate the principle of impartiality can lead to the provision of resources to warring sides and that external aid can free-up internal resources, which prolongs internal conflicts and legitimizes warring sides. Moreover, NGO hiring of local personnel can contribute to economic market distortions (for both labor and goods) and reinforces existing societal divisions which may further exacerbate, if not sustain, existing security challenges.⁵⁵

In addition to this uncertain performance in the field, which can serve to distort local populace incentives, there is also a concern regarding NGO accountability. While NGO initiatives like the Sphere Project have attempted to address this issue in regards to development projects and standards, there are still concerns about what is known as “the democracy deficit;” potential problems may arise from a situation where operational NGOs are not accountable to the local populace or government, but rather, to donors and funding sources. This is problematic in that it can significantly impact NGO responsiveness to the needs of their beneficiaries in local populations and potentially complicate U.S. military and civilian agency’s attempts to coordinate and synchronize efforts in a given region.

Funding and Formalization

The “democracy deficit” is related to and leads toward a third critique of NGOs regarding donor funding and its impact on an NGO’s perceived independence and neutrality. While estimates vary, there is significant evidence that sources of official governmental funding for NGOs has increased dramatically in recent years.⁵⁶ This relationship between NGOs and the U.S. Government complicates the NGO “non-governmental” distinction and can serve to reduce their independence.⁵⁷ For example, if an advocacy NGO relies on official government funds, their ability to question and criticize that same government’s policies is potentially compromised by a natural unwillingness to “bite the hand that feeds.” Relatedly, both operational and advocacy NGOs, regardless of the status of their respective funding, may find themselves becoming “donor-driven.” That is, their projects may be supply-driven based on donor demands rather than demand-driven based on recipient need. It is also reasonable to question the effect that donor (government or otherwise) monitoring and evaluation requirements have on NGOs’ ability and freedom to design and implement projects of their own. NGO work in these environments may become increasingly defined by U.S. government goals and objectives if they use a USAID framework (due to contractual requirements in funding agreements) for monitoring and evaluation of their own programs.⁵⁸

Another area of concern is the effect of competition among and between NGOs for donor funds in an increasingly important private “charity market.” Observers of humanitarian and development aid identify this competition as being responsible for not only adversely affecting NGO programs and focus, but also for “formalizing” many NGOs, resulting in organizations that are as bureaucratic and hierarchical as the governments they purportedly replace in the development and aid realm. In fact, there is growing evidence that working in an NGO is now simply another part of a young, educated policy professional’s career, similar to and part of the same career progression that includes working in government or working for a for-profit consulting firm in the private sector.⁵⁹ The above funding concerns serve to reinforce the U.S. military concern that the evolving character of the strategic and operational environment may be changing the importance of NGOs maintaining impartiality and neutrality while interacting with the military.

Politics and Humanitarian Assistance

Finally, there are nuanced complexities in the NGO claim to be motivated solely by the humanitarian imperative. While many NGOs claim this humanitarian imperative and eschew political motivations for their work in principle, the nature of the contemporary environment, defined in part by mass media, increased competition for funding, and intolerant extremist groups makes the practice of such goals more difficult. This can be attributed to two causal factors. First, an inherent tension exists between securing funding and politics. In many cases, “geopolitical hotspots,” which are likely to have the least amount of “humanitarian space”

(defined in part by an absence of foreign military forces), are also likely to be the object of significant amounts of private and official donor funding (and may account for some of the increased interaction between the military and NGOs). This dependence on private, unprogrammed funding can also impact the NGO's claim to have a long-term horizon. There is an important distinction between the duration of a physical presence in a country and the amount of resources devoted to that same location. It does not necessarily follow that a long-term presence in a specific location equates to a long-term development horizon. If NGO donor sources are partially motivated by "ephemeral" political considerations (either in regards to location, or specific issue, etc), then NGOs may unintentionally be forced to leave (or significantly scale-back operations) in a certain area when the respective "political issue du jour" is replaced by a different issue in another part of the world. This movement out of or scaling back in a certain area can "contribute to a general decline in local self-sufficiency and self-help that makes the transition back to a peacetime economy more difficult."⁶⁰ Second, and more simply, apolitical intervention and assistance in complex security environments is increasingly difficult given that an outsider's presence in an area is political by its very nature as their efforts always involve decision-making regarding the allocation of scarce and valued resources. This is true, even if an NGO is doing nothing more than attempting to maintain an *a priori* status quo. Moreover, inherently political issues such as women's education and rights, civil-society development, and economic development can be perceived as largely western, liberal notions that have political ramifications above and beyond the humanitarian benefits they may bring to an area or people.

In sum, NGOs are confronted with (and in some cases create) many challenges to their operations in contemporary environments that complicate their normative claims to operate solely according to the principles of humanitarianism, independence, and neutrality. There are also important NGO funding and political considerations that affect their principles and effectiveness that can affect NGO relationships with the U.S. military.

Current Status of the Relationship and Ways Forward

Over seven years have passed since the beginning of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan while operations in Iraq are in their sixth year. What is the current status of this relationship, and how has it evolved over time?

Early on, efforts have been focused on the creation and dissemination of the InterAction and Department of Defense Guidelines at the policy/strategic level. A Civil-Military Working Group was established to create the guidelines and has continued to meet at the United States Institute of Peace's headquarters on a bi-monthly basis to sustain the dialogue. More recently, Senior Development Advisors from USAID have been placed in each COCOM to act as interlocutors between NGOs and the military leadership. Additionally, NGO planning liaisons are being contemplated for use in the regional DoD Combatant Commands on an as necessary basis to provide input into contingency planning and operations. Finally, a NGO input and review process for Combatant Command Theater Campaign Plans (TCPs) is also a possibility.

At the operational and tactical level, there is an opportunity to begin training and education initiatives aimed at disseminating the Interaction/DoD Guidelines in military schools and at military training centers such as the National Training Center (NTC) in California and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) in Louisiana. In addition to the training centers, the guidelines should also be considered for inclusion into the Professional Military Education

system and the formal doctrine centers at the Army's Training and Doctrine Command and Fort Leavenworth's U.S. Army Combined Arms Center.

Finally, there may be potential returns to further investment in the development of an analogous set of guidelines prescribing the behaviors and expectations of NGOs and the military in disaster response and/or non-hostile development environments. The latter would perhaps be most contentious given the NGO communities' stated preference for a military absence from development activities; however, there are likely benefits to be gleaned from just such a dialogue.

The above initiatives are signs of growth in the NGO-Military relationship. However, now is the time to fundamentally address the roles and responsibilities of NGOs and the military in complex environments. NGOs, like most civilian actors, simply do not see much of a role for the military in humanitarian space, even in the most dangerous of environments. The military, on the other hand, perceives a significant benefit to conducting humanitarian assistance and development work in all environments. For NGOs, the primary question is one of the proper divisions of labor. Thus, given current USG foreign policy and operational trends, can NGOs and the military reconcile their overlapping operational jurisdictions? Can the military be made appropriately aware of the long-term development consequences of its work? Can NGOs become sufficiently sensitive to the security dynamics of complex environments to recognize some problems are at least *temporarily* amenable to shorter-term humanitarian assistance solutions? While the operating environment may seem to dictate or suggest different models of cooperation (such as the UN-IASC model) based on security levels, the two communities should more fundamentally define and determine clearer roles and responsibilities that might apply in all environments.⁶¹

Conclusion

In this era of globalization, transnational challenges to the order and stability of the international system are as important as national sovereignty and security. Moreover, the struggle is multifaceted; it will require military, political, and civil efforts in concert. Thus, a complex array of stakeholders—government civilian agencies, international partners, non-government organizations, the military, the private sector, local workers, and many others—will be needed to face these evolving challenges. In particular, the relationship between NGOs and the military is likely to be an important one, even given a potential increase in the U.S. government's civilian capacities. Therefore, both communities must address the assumptions, preconceptions, and difficulties in their relationship in an open and honest manner. In the end, it is important to remember this relationship exists only because NGOs and the military share *some* common purposes such as preventing conflict and creating stability in fragile and failing states.

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