

## **Are Civil-Military Relations Still a Problem?**

*Richard Betts*

Since Huntington wrote, major changes have occurred in the United States' external security environment and domestic political institutions. These have not fundamentally changed the nature of civil-military relations. The enduring issues are tensions over the military preference for overwhelming force, and over the boundary between military expertise and political authority. Since Huntington wrote, the problem of civil-military relations has proved more modest and manageable than many feared it would be, not clearly worse or more dangerous than conflicts between political leaders and other government bureaucracies. The realistic solution is not a rigid application of either of Huntington's ideal types, but pragmatic compromises that tilt in favor objective control. Critics of objective control have neglected the extent to which civilian mistakes in making strategy rival the military's. They have neglected to confront the arguments against subjective control, in part because they focus on limitations of objective control for optimizing the functional imperative, or because they misjudge the dangers posed by newly overt partisanship of the officer corps, dangers that would only become acute if subjective control becomes the norm.

## **Rethinking Subjective Control: Political Activities of the Military in Democracies**

*Risa Brooks*

The fact that military leaders and their organizations can often engage in political activity in democratic states is often underappreciated by both scholars and practitioners. This paper details a range of tactics available to military leaders, including public appeals to citizenry at large, alliance building with civilian constituencies and interest groups, resignation (under particular circumstances) and shoulder tapping members of the legislative branch. It then identifies a number of potential advantages that these activities have for promoting improved policy and political-military integration in strategy. However, it also explores some potential downsides, concluding that these activities are ultimately detrimental to the military's own organizational interests and to democratic institutions. The paper also suggests that Huntington's concept of objective control minimizes both the benefits that political activity can yield and the full range of potential costs also involved when militaries and their leaders employ these tactics.

## **Obedience, Competence and Doing What is Wrong**

*James Burk*

Samuel Huntington's discussion of the professional military ethic examines the norm that professional military officers must obey the commands of their superiors. Following this norm is thought essential for efficient military operations and for maintaining civilian control over the military. Yet what is required to follow this norm? Huntington correctly rejects the simple claim that strict obedience to commands is always required. But once that is done, how do we say when it is or is not right to do what is (usually) wrong? Huntington's answer to this question is interesting and provocative, but not entirely convincing for at least two reasons. First, while acknowledging the need for it, he fails to provide an adequate account of how or when military obedience may and may not be limited. Second, because he thinks military professional competence rests on the possession of expert knowledge, he neglects the role that choice (particularly moral choice) must play in deciding how and how well that knowledge is applied. Redressing these deficiencies, I contend, requires that we create spaces within which professional and moral autonomy are protected even when that entails some wrong doing or doing what one has no right to do.

## **Something Old, Something New: Identity and Professionalism in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Army**

*Jason Dempsey*

In Samuel Huntington's seminal work on civil-military relations he outlined how universal service had created militaries where "the enlisted men became a cross section of the national population – citizens at heart – and officers became a separate professional group living in a world of their own with few ties to outside society." Huntington's work focused on how the developing professionalism of the officer corps would prevent officers from violating principles of civilian control, despite the distance between the officer corps and civilian society.

In the years since Huntington outlined these arguments the enlisted ranks of the U.S. Army have surprisingly remained a fairly representative cross section of the national population on several key dimensions, despite the shift to an All Volunteer Force. However, much of the onus for maintaining demographic representation in the ranks has fallen to the Army leadership, which is not yet comfortable with this new role and is having to shift its

institutional mindset to deal with such concerns as gender equality and racial diversity.

Further challenging the officer ranks is the new dynamic of competing professions, whereby Army officers find themselves competing in the political sphere for resources and missions. This is a development that the officer corps has not handled well, as research suggests that the identity of officers has shifted from an apolitical conservatism to one that is overtly political and partisan. The implications of this development extend beyond elite-level interactions to internal Army policies and to the Army's broader relationship with American society.

This paper will examine these trends from the perspective of internal Army surveys and evolving perceptions of the military by the American public.

### **Huntington's Hartz: The Clash of Civilizations Between America's Civilian Liberalism and Military Realism**

*Michael Desch*

This paper will use Huntington's Hartzian argument about how America's civilian Liberal Tradition causes conflict with the military's conservative realism and explore the seeming paradox that civil-military relations under President Bush have been little better than they were under Clinton.

### **The Military Mind and the Military Profession: A Reassessment of the Ideological Roots of American Military Professionalism**

*Darrell W. Driver*

The view of the philosophically isolated and ideologically alienated military officer is one with a long history in the American imagination. At the center of America's political theoretic tradition stands the Hartzian image of an abiding liberal consensus, on the periphery, the military officer and the pariah conservative beliefs of the "military mind." Though Huntington did not invent the term military mind, he was, perhaps, its most articulate and sympathetic biographer, associating the ideological ideal-type with traditions of Burkean conservatism and arguing that these views play a functionally necessary role in professional military service. This paper sets out to test these claims for a new generation of military officers, with a changed and changing set of professional pressures and functional requirements. First, is there evidence that in their deepest public beliefs today's military officers are as distinct from the mainsprings of American political thought as military mind claims would have it? Here, a combination of fresh approaches in the

empirical study of political ideology are introduced to provide answers to this question. Foreshadowing the conclusion, it will be argued that coherence and homogeneity of military mind archetypes are well off the mark. Moreover, the public opinion poll's revealed dominance of political conservatism in the officer corps masks a much more heterogeneous underlying reality, where idiosyncratic individual public narratives refuse easy civilian-military or conservative-liberal categorizations. Second, what are the implications of these findings for the professional officer corps? If we take the military mind heuristic out of Huntington's theory, with what are we left? More specifically, if the benign Burkean-conservatism, which Huntington argued underpinned military professional neutrality, cannot be confirmed, what does that do for the professional model of civil-military relations? In short, sixty years after Samuel Huntington wrestled an inarticulate image of alien military conservatism into articulacy and ultimately a professional theory of civil-military relations, this paper introduces new data in order to revisit this conjoining of ideological archetype, military professionalism, and civil-military relations.

### **The Soldier and the State: The Anatomy of a Classic & Methodological Transformation of a Subdiscipline**

*Peter Feaver and Erika Seeler*

Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* was groundbreaking not only for its theory, but also for its method. Huntington's work marked a critical juncture in the methodological development of the subdiscipline, shifting the field's terrain of inquiry from one previously dominated by descriptive historical and biographical sketches to one increasingly guided by the dictates of standard social scientific reasoning and techniques. Here we trace the evolution of the social science of civil-military relations, and Huntington's place in that story. We survey the pre- and post-Huntingtonian literatures in American civil-military relations and highlight the evolution in methods that first crystallized with *The Soldier and the State* and continued to progress through fifty years of further methodological innovation in the social sciences. The same epistemological and methodological debates that have shaped social science disciplines over the last half-century have enormously affected the study of civil-military relations. Huntington's methodological insights - - that more rigor would enrich our understanding of civil-military relations, that methodological ecumenism rather than monism was needed, and that method must be the servant not the master - - continue to be relevant and appropriate for scholarship today.

## **Enhancing National Security and Civilian Control of the Military: An Argument for a Madisonian Approach.**

*Chris Gibson*

How should elected leaders organize and arrange their relationships with the U.S. military to maximize effective national security policies and outcomes while ensuring civilian control of the armed forces?

This article is a call to scholars to help elected leaders by creating more normative models and options related to how they might organize and arrange their relationship with the military. To do this, I describe and analyze the prevailing literature and the two existing theoretical alternatives (Samuel Huntington and Richard Kohn's "Objective Control" and Morris Janowitz and Eliot Cohen's "Subjective Control") and find them wanting before offering my own proposal, which I call "Madisonian Control" because of its inspiration from the Founders of establishing countervailing forces as a means to maximize effectiveness and accountability. Through the Madisonian proposal I provide policy recommendations that amount to significant recommended changes to Goldwater-Nichols and new norms for military officers serving in top-level national security decisionmaking support positions in the civil-military nexus where advisors help elected leaders appreciate the strategic landscape and sort through options prior to making weighty decisions.

## **Samuel P. Huntington and Civil-Military Relations in the United States Today**

*Richard Kohn*

This paper will begin by analyzing *The Soldier and the State* (and some of Huntington's other civil-military writings) and briefly assessing their importance and influence. At more length and in greater depth, it will then analyze the deficiencies of that 1957 work, pointing out from an historian's perspective the problems with the theory and analysis. This paper will then make a preliminary effort to characterize the nature of that part of civil-military relations that concerns the relationship between the topmost uniformed officers and their civilian superiors as that nature has played out historically in the United States. This is not intended as a replacement for Huntington's theory, but as a review of the reality of the relationship that soldiers and scholars must deal with. The emphasis would be on the period

since World War II, and particularly since the end of the Cold War. In the light of this, a sort of "catechism" of the proper (for military professionalism) and functional (for national defense) behaviors on the part of the military and the civilians.

### **Several Hundred Thousand: Rumsfeld, Shinseki and Civil-Military Tension**

*Matthew Moten*

When Senator Carl Levin asked for his professional judgment on how many soldiers would be required to secure Iraq, General Eric K. Shinseki found himself in a civil-military dilemma, caught between his responsibilities to the Executive and the Legislative branches and the demands of his own professional ethos. Samuel Huntington's attempt to frame civilian control of the military as either objective or subjective provides a theoretical starting point, but these archetypes war with human reality and offer little of use to practitioners. Recently, Eliot Cohen has argued for a more realistic model characterized by an "unequal dialogue" between civilian and military leaders. Still, the relationship between generals and their civilian superiors is always personal as well as professional. Relationships between people with great shared responsibility can become stormy. The problems manifest in these relationships demand exploration, which may point up the need for new thinking about civil-military relations. How does the military professional negotiate the functional and societal imperatives in such a storm? What should generals do when their superiors' decisions are potentially damaging to the military institution or to national security? What steps might be taken to address the civilian side of the relationship? Is it possible to structure civil-military relationships to ensure effective policy and strategic outcomes? The overlapping tenures of recent Army chief of staff Shinseki and Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld provide a controversial example of politico-military tensions at the highest levels and in particularly challenging times. This study of their relationship may shed light on possible answers to these questions.

### **A Return to Pre-Westphalian Warfare: Implications for the Military Professions**

*Williamson Murray*

This paper examines a return to a "pre-Westphalian" pattern of warfare for the foreseeable future and examine what this trend means for the development of future officers.

## **Achieving Victory in War: Overcoming a Narrow View of the Military Profession**

*Nadia Schadlow and Richard Lacquement*

A central argument made by Samuel Huntington in the *Soldier and the State* focused on the importance of the military's development into a distinct profession, one focused on the very specific features and aspects of combat. Huntington argued that the military profession was set apart from others by its focus on "the management of violence." SSTR operations are separated from this view of the Army profession because they do not explicitly involve "the management of violence" and would at best be considered, in Huntington's framework, "auxiliary vocations." The strict division of tasks between the military and civilian world, as described by Huntington, served as a means of ensuring civilian control over the military. However, this historical separation also contributed to Army's reluctance to embrace fully SSTR operations.

Certainly, the Army and the defense policy community as a whole have made considerable progress in their thinking about how to bolster the military's capabilities in the area of SSTR operations. Key obstacles remain however, both within the Army and among the broader civilian policy community, which left unaddressed, are likely to inhibit some of the key steps needed to optimize U.S. ability to conduct SSTR operations in the future. This paper will focus on the need to embrace security, stability and reconstruction operations (SSTR) as a core mission for the United States military, particularly the Army. It begins from the premise that although the Army and the Defense Department have made significant progress regarding these tasks, key obstacles remain and must be addressed in order for a real integration of the two key elements of the military profession – the conduct of combat operations with a broader, carefully crafted political framework.

## **Changing Conceptions of the Military Profession**

*David Segal and Karin De Angelis*

Social research on the American military during the first four decades of the twentieth century was minimal, and focused on enlisted personnel--- primarily conscripts---who comprised 85 percent of the force. Post-World War II conceptualizations, such as Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* and Morris Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier*, redirected the conversation from conscription to the active-duty officer corps. Huntington and Janowitz were concerned with the nature of the profession of arms and its relationship to the state and to society, rather than with the professionalism of individual officers, although contemporary discourse has increasingly focused on the latter. Recently it has been argued that changes in military conflicts, particularly the increase in Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW), coupled with post-modernism, have led to a decline of professionalism within the military. I suggest a return to a focus on the nature of the profession rather than on individual professionals, and propose that society, which grants certain occupations the privilege of being regarded as professions, is broadening its definition of the profession of arms beyond active duty commissioned officers, to include Reserve commissioned officers as well as active duty and Reserve senior noncommissioned officers. We have entered an era of educated, technically advanced volunteer service members within the officer and senior enlisted ranks whose duties extend beyond Huntington's professional distinction of "managing violence." Additionally, we have seen the role of the Reserves transform from a strategic reserve to an operational force.